Subject: Privacy & Anonymity on the Internet FAQ
Date: 16 Feb 1993 06:03:24 GMT
Expires: 23 Mar 1993 06:02:09 GMT
Summary: Email and account privacy, anonymous mailing and posting, 
 encryption, and other privacy and rights issues associated with use
 of the Internet and global networks in general.
X-Last-Updated: 1993/02/16

Archive-name: net-privacy/part1
Version: 2.0



IDENTITY, PRIVACY, and ANONYMITY on the INTERNET
================================================

(c) 1993 L. Detweiler.  Not for commercial use except by permission
from author, otherwise may be freely copied.  Not to be altered. 
Please credit if quoted.

SUMMARY
=======

Information on email and account privacy, anonymous mailing and 
posting, encryption, and other privacy and rights issues associated
with use of the Internet and global networks in general.

(Search for <#.#> for exact section. Search for '_' (underline) for
next section.)

PART 1
====== (this file)

Identity
--------
<1.1> What is `identity' on the internet?
<1.2> Why is identity (un)important on the internet?
<1.3> How does my email address (not) identify me and my background?
<1.4> How can I find out more about somebody from their email address?
<1.5> Why is identification (un)stable on the internet? 
<1.6> What is the future of identification on the internet?

Privacy
-------
<2.1> What is `privacy' on the internet?
<2.2> Why is privacy (un)important on the internet?
<2.3> How (in)secure are internet networks?
<2.4> How (in)secure is my account?
<2.5> How (in)secure is X Windows?
<2.6> How (in)secure is my email?
<2.7> How am I (not) liable for my email and postings?
<2.8> How do I provide more/less information to others on my identity?
<2.9> Who is my sysadmin?  What does s/he know about me?
<2.10> Why is privacy (un)stable on the internet?
<2.11> What is the future of privacy on the internet?

Anonymity
---------
<3.1> What is `anonymity' on the internet?
<3.2> Why is `anonymity' (un)important on the internet?
<3.3> How can anonymity be protected on the internet?
<3.4> How do I send anonymous mail?
<3.5> How do I post anonymously?
<3.6> How do I `kill' anonymous postings?
<3.7> What are the responsibilities associated with anonymity?
<3.8> Why is anonymity (un)stable on the internet?
<3.9> What is the future of anonymity on the internet?

PART 2
====== (next file)

Resources
---------
<4.1> What UNIX programs are related to privacy?
<4.2> What are some anonymous remailing and posting sites?
<4.3> How can I learn about or use cryptography?
<4.4> What is the cypherpunks mailing list?
<4.5> What are some privacy-related newsgroups?  FAQs?
<4.6> What is internet Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM)?
<4.7> What are other Request For Comments (RFCs) related to privacy?
<4.8> How can I run an anonymous remailer?
<4.9> What are references on privacy in email?
<4.10> What are some email, Usenet, and internet use policies?
<4.11> What is the MIT ``CROSSLINK'' anonymous message TV program?

Miscellaneous
-------------
<5.1> What is ``digital cash''?
<5.2> What is a ``hacker'' or ``cracker''?
<5.3> What is a ``cypherpunk''?
<5.4> What is an anonymous pool?
<5.5> What is `security through obscurity'?
<5.6> What are `identity daemons'?
<5.7> What is the history behind anonymous posting servers?
<5.8> What standards are needed to guard electronic privacy?

Issues
------
<6.1> What is the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF)?
<6.2> What is `operation Sun Devil' and the Steve Jackson Game case?
<6.3> What is Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN)?
<6.4> What is the National Research and Education Network (NREN)?
<6.5> What is the FBI's proposed Digital Telephony Act?
<6.6> What other U.S. legislation is related to privacy on networks?
<6.7> What are references on rights in cyberspace?
<6.8> What is the Computers and Academic Freedom (CAF) archive?
<6.9> What is the background behind the Internet?
<6.10> How is Internet `anarchy' like the English language?

Footnotes
---------
<7.1> Most Wanted list
<7.2> Change history

PART 3
====== (last file)

Commentary
----------
<8.1> What is the value of anonymity?
<8.2> Should anonymous posting to all groups be allowed?
<8.3> What should system operators do with anonymous postings?


* * *


IDENTITY
========

_____
<1.1> What is `identity' on the internet?

  Generally, today people's `identity' on the internet is primarily
  determined by their email address in the sense that this is their
  most unchanging 'face' in the electronic realm.   This is your
  login name qualified by the complete address domain information,
  for example ``ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu''.  People see
  this address when receiving mail or reading USENET posts from you
  and in other situations where programs record usage.  Some obsolete
  forms of addresses (such as BITNET) still persist.

  In email messages, additional information on the path that a message
  takes is prepended to the message received by the recipient.  This
  information identifies the chain of hosts involved in the
  transmission and is a very accurate trace of its origination.  This
  type of identify-and-forward protocol is also used in the USENET
  protocol to a lesser extent.  Forging these fields requires
  corrupted mailing software at sites involved in the forwarding and
  is very uncommon.  Not so uncommon is forging the chain at the
  origination point, so that all initial sites in the list are faked
  at the time the message is created.  Tracing these messages can be
  difficult or impossible when the initial faked fields are names of
  real machines and represent real transfer routes.

_____
<1.2> Why is identity (un)important on the internet?

  The concept of identity is closely intertwined with communication,
  privacy, and security, which in turn are all critical aspects of
  computer networks. For example, the convenience of communication
  afforded by email would be impossible without conventions for
  identification.  But there are many potential abuses of identity
  possible that can have very severe consequences, with massive
  computer networks at the forefront of the issue, which can
  potentially either exacerbate or solve these problems.

  Verifying that an identity is correct is called `authentication',
  and one classic example of the problems associated with it is
  H.G.Well's ``War of the Worlds'' radio broadcast that fooled
  segments of the population into thinking that an alien invasion was
  in progress.  Hoaxes of this order are not uncommon on Usenet and
  forged identities makes them more insidious.  People and their
  reputations can be assaulted by forgery.

  However, the fluidity of identity on the internet is for some one of
  its most attractive features. Identity is just as useful as it is
  harmful.  A professor might carefully explain a topic until he
  finds he is talking to an undergraduate. A person of a particular
  occupation may be able to converse with others who might normally
  shun him.  Some prejudices are erased, but, on the other hand, many
  prejudices are useful!  A scientist might argue he can better
  evaluate the findings of a paper as a reviewer if he knows more
  about the authors.  Likewise, he may be more likely to reject it
  based on unfair or irrelevant criteria.  On the other side of the
  connection,  the author may find identities of reviewers useful in
  exerting pressure for acceptance.

  Identity is especially crucial in establishing and regulating
  `credit' (not necessarily financial) and `ownership' and `usage'. 
  Many functions in society demand reliable and accurate techniques
  for identification. Heavy reliance will be placed on digital
  authentication as global economies become increasingly electronic. 
  Many government functions and services are based on identification,
  and law enforcement frequently hinges on it.  Hence, employees of
  many government organizations push toward stronger identification
  structures.  But when does identification invade privacy?

  The growth of the internet is provoking social forces of massive
  proportions. Decisions made now on issues of identity will affect
  many future users, especially as the network becomes increasingly
  global, universal, widespread, and entrenched; and the positive or
  adverse affects of these actions, intended and inadvertent,  will
  literally be magnified exponentially.

_____
<1.3> How does my email address (not) identify me and my background?

  Your email address may contain information that influences people's
  perceptions of your background.  The address may `identify' you as
  from a department at a particular university, an employee at a
  company, or a government worker.  It may contain your last name,
  initials, or cryptic identification codes independent of both.  In
  the US some are based on parts of social security numbers.  Others
  are in the form 'u2338' where the number is incremented in the
  order that new users are added to the system.

  Standard internet addresses  also can contain information  on your
  broad geographical location or nationhood.  However, none of this
  information is guaranteed to be correct or be there at all.  The
  fields in the domain qualification of the username are based on
  rather arbitrary organization, such as (mostly invisible) network
  cabling distributions.  The only point to make is that early fields
  in the address are more specific (such as specific computer names
  or local networks) and the later ones the most general (such as
  continental domains).  Typically the first field is the name of the
  computer receiving mail.

  Gleaning information from the email address alone is sometimes an
  inspired art or an inconsistent and futile exercise.  (For more
  information, see the FAQs on email  addresses and known
  geographical distributions below.)  However, UNIX utilities exist
  to aid in the quest (see the question on this).

  Common Suffixes
  ---------------

  .us    United States
  .uk    United Kingdom
  .ca    Canada
  .fi    Finland
  .au    Australia

  .edu   university or college
  .com   commercial organization
  .org   'other' (e.g. nonprofit organization)
  .gov   government
  .mil   military site
 
_____
<1.4> How can I find out more about somebody with a given email address?

  One simple way is to send email to that address, asking.  Another
  way is to send mail to the postmaster at that address (i.e.
  postmaster@address), although the postmaster's job is more to help
  find user ID's of particular people given their real name and solve
  mail routing problems.  The sysadmin (i.e. `root@address') may also
  be able to supply information.  Users with related email address
  may have information.  However, all of these methods rely on the
  time and patience of others so use them minimally.

  One of the most basic tools for determining identity over the
  internet is the UNIX utility 'finger'.  The basic syntax is:

    finger user@here.there.everywhere

  This utility uses communication protocols to query the computer
  named in the address for information on the user named.  The
  response is generated completely by the receiving computer and may
  be in any format.  Possible responses are as follows:

  - A message `unknown host' meaning some aspect of the address is
    incorrect, two lines with no information and '???'.
  
  - A message 'In real life: ???' in which case the receiving computer
    could not find any kind of a match on the username. The finger
    utility may return this response in other situations.
  
  - A listing of information associated with multiple users. Some
    computers will search only for matching user IDs, others will
    attempt to find the username you specified as a substring of all
    actual full names of users kept in a local database.
  
  At some sites 'finger' can be used to get a list of all users on the
  system with a `finger @address'.  In general this is often
  considered weak security, however, because `attackers' know valid
  user ID's to `crack' passwords.

  More information on the fields returned by `finger' is given below. 
  More information on `finger' and locating people's email addresses
  is given in the email FAQ (such as the WHOIS lookup utility).  Just
  as you can use these means to find out about others, they can use
  them to find out about you.  You can `finger' yourself to find out
  what is publicly reported by your UNIX system about you.  Be
  careful when modifying `finger' data; virtually anyone with
  internet access worldwide can query this information.

_____
<1.5> Why is identification (un)stable on the internet?

  Generally, identity is an amorphous and almost nonexistent concept
  on the Internet for a variety of reasons.  One is the inherent
  fluidity of `cyberspace' where people emerge and submerge
  frequently, and absences are not readily noted in the `community'. 
  Most people remember faces and voices, the primary means of casual
  identification in the 'real world'.  The arbitary and cryptic 
  sequences of letters and digits comprising most email addresses are
  not particularly noticeable or memorable and far from a unique
  identification of an individual, who may use multiple accounts on
  multiple machines anywhere in the world.

  Currently internet users do not really have any great assurances
  that the messages in email and USENET are from who they appear to
  be. A person's mailing address is far from an identification of an
  individual.  
  
  - Anyone with access to the account, e.g. they know the password,
    either legitimately or otherwise, can send mail with that address
    in the From: line.
  
  - Email addresses for an individual tend to change frequently as
    they switch jobs or make moves inside their organizations. 

  - As part of current mailing protocol standards, forging the From:
    line in mail messages is a fairly trivial operation for many
    hackers.
    
  The status and path information prepended to messages by
  intermediate hosts is generally unforgeable. In general, while
  possible, forgeries are fairly rare on most newsgroups and in
  email.  Besides these pathological cases abve there are many basic
  problems with today's internet protocols affecting identification
  on the internet:

  - Internet mail standards, described in RFC-822, are still evolving
    rapidly and not entirely orderly.  For example, standards for
    mail address `munging' or `parsing' tend to vary slightly between
    sites and frequently mean the difference between finding
    addresses and bouncing mail.
  
  - Domain names and computer names are frequently changed at sites,
    and there are delays in the propagation of this data.
  
  - Addresses cannot be resolved when certain critical computers
    crash, such as the receiving computer or other computers involved
    in resolving names into addresses called `nameservers'. 
  
  - A whole slew of problems is associated with  `nameservers'; if
    they are not updated they will not find name addresses, and even
    the operation of what constitutes `updating' has different
    interpretations at different sites.
  
  The current internet mailing and addressing protocols are slightly
  anachronistic in that they were created when the network was
  somewhat obscure and not widespread, with only a fraction of the
  traffic it now sees.  Today a large proportion of internet traffic
  is email, comprising  millions of messages.

_____
<1.6> What is the future of identification on the internet?

  Some new technologies and standards are introducing facial images
  and voice messages  into mail and these will improve the sense of
  community that comes from the familiarity of identification.
  However, they are not currently widespread, require large amounts
  of data transfer, standardized software, and make some compromises
  in privacy.

  Promising new cryptographic techniques may make 'digital signatures'
  and 'digital authentication' common (see below).  Also, the trend
  in USENET standards is toward greater authentication of posted
  information.  On the other hand, advances in ensuring anonymity
  (such as remailers) are forthcoming.  See below.


PRIVACY
=======

_____
<2.1> What is `privacy' on the internet?

  Generally, while `privacy' has multiple connotations in society and
  perhaps even more on the internet, in cyberspace most take it to
  mean that you have exclusive use and access to your account and the
  data stored on and and directed to it (such as email), and you do
  not encounter arbitrary restrictions or searches.  In other words, 
  others may obtain data associated with your account, but not
  without your permission.  These ideas are probably both fairly
  limiting and liberal in their scope in what most internet users
  consider their private domains.  Some users don't expect or want
  any privacy, some expect and demand it.

_____
<2.2> Why is privacy (un)important on the internet?

  This is a somewhat debatable and inflammatory topic, arousing
  passionate opinions.  On the internet, some take privacy for
  granted and are rudely surprised to find it tenuous or nonexistent.
  Most governments have rules that protect privacy (such as the
  illegal search and seizure clause of the U.S. constitution, adopted
  by others) but have many that are antithetical to it (such as laws
  prohibiting secret communications or allowing wiretapping). These
  rules generally carry over to the internet with few specific rules
  governing it.  However, the legal repercussions of the global
  internet are still largely unknown and untested (i.e. no strong
  legal precedents and court cases).  The fact that internet traffic
  frequently passes past international boundaries, and is not
  centrally managed, significantly complicates and strongly
  discourages its regulation.

_____
<2.3> How (in)secure are internet networks?

  - `Theoretically' people at any site in the chain of sites with
    access to hardware and network media that transmits data over the
    Internet  could potentially monitor or archive it. However, the
    sheer volume and general 'noise' inherent to this data makes
    these scenarios highly improbable, even by government agencies
    with supposedly vast funding and resources.
  
  - Technologies exist to `tap' magnetic fields given off by
    electrical wires without detection.  Less obscurely, any machine
    with a network connection is a potential station for traffic
    detection, but this scenario requires knowledge and access to
    very low-level hardware (the network card) to pursue, if even
    possible.
  
  - A company Network General Inc. is one of many that manufactures
    and markets sophisticated network monitoring tools that can
    'filter' and read packets by arbitrary criteria for
    troubleshooting purposes, but the cost of this type of device is
    prohibitive for casual use.

  Known instances of the above types of security  breaches at a major
  scale (such as at network hubs) are very rare. The greatest risks
  tend to emerge locally.  Note that all these approaches are almost
  completely defused with the use of cryptography.
    
_____
<2.4> How (in)secure is my account?

  By default, not very.  There are a multitude of factors that may
  reinforce or compromise aspects of your privacy on the internet. 
  First, your account must be secure from other users. The universal
  system is to use a password, but if it is `weak' (i.e. easy to
  guess) this security is significantly diminished.  Somewhat
  surprisingly and frighteningly to some, certain  users of the
  system, particularly the administrator, generally have unlimited
  access regardless of passwords, and may grant that access to
  others.  This means that they may read any file in your account
  without detection.

  Furthermore, not universally known, most UNIX systems keep fairly
  extensive accounting records of when and where you logged in, what
  commands you execute, and when they are executed (in fact, login
  information is usually public). Most features of this `auditing' or
   `process accounting' information are enabled by default after the
  initial installation and the system administrator may customize it
  to strengthen or weaken it to satisfy performance or privacy aims. 
  This information is frequently consulted for troubleshooting
  purposes and may otherwise be ignored.  This data tracks
  unsuccessful login attempts and other 'suspicious' activities on
  the system. A traditional part of the UNIX system that tracks user
  commands is easily circumvented by the user with the use of
  symbolic links (described  in 'man ln').
  
  UNIX implementations vary widely particularly in tracking features
  and new sophisticated mechanisms are introduced by companies
  regularly. Typically system adminstrators augment the basic UNIX
  functionality with public-domain programs and locally-developed
  tools for monitoring, and use them only to isolate suspicious
  activity as it arises.
  
  Generally, you should expect little privacy on your account for
  various reasons:
  
  - Potentially, every keystroke you type could be intercepted by
    someone else. 

  - System administrators make extensive backups that are completely
    invisible to users which may record the states of an account over
    many weeks. 

  - Erased files can, under many operating systems, be undeleted. 

  - Most automated services keep logs of use for troubleshooting or
    otherwise; for example FTP sites usually log the commands and
    record the domain originations of users, including anonymous
    ones.

  - Some software exacerbates these problems.  See the section on
    ``X Windows (in)security''.
  
  The most important privacy considerations are related to file
  rights, and many lapses can be traced to their misunderstood nature
  or haphazard maintenance. Be aware of the rights associated with
  your files and directories in UNIX. If the `x' (`execute') right on
  your parent directory is off for users, groups, and other, these
  users cannot gain information on anything in your directories. 
  Anything less may allow others to read, change, or even delete
  files in your home directory.  By default most accounts are
  accessable only to the owner, but the initial configuration varies
  between sites based on administrator preference.  The default file
  mode specifies the initial rights associated with newly created
  files, and can be set in the shell.  The details of rights
  implementations tend to vary between versions of UNIX.  Consult man
  pages on `chmod' and `ls'.

  Examples
  --------

    traver.lance % ls -ld ~
    drwx------ 15 ld231782     1536 Jan 31 21:22 /users/ld231782/

  Here is a listing of the rights associated with a user's home
  directory, denoted by `~'.  The columns at the left identify what
  rights are available. The first column identifies the entry as a
  directory, and the next three columns mean that read, write, and
  execute rights, respectively, are permitted for that user.  For
  directories, the `x' right means that contents (file and
  subdirectory names) within that directory can be listed. The
  subsequent columns indicate that no other users have any rights to
  anything in the directory tree originating at that point.  They
  can't even `see' any lower files or subdirectories; the hierarchy
  is completely invisible to them.

    traver.lance % ls -l msg
    -rw-r--r--  1 ld231782   35661 Jan 29 23:13 msg
    traver.lance % chmod u=rw,g=,o= msg
    traver.lance % ls -l msg
    -rw-------  1 ld231782   35661 Jan 29 23:13 msg

  Here the modes on the file `msg' were changed to take away rights
  from `group' and `other'.

  Indepedent of malevolent administrators are fellow users, a much
  more commonly harmful threat. There are multiple ways to help
  ensure that your account will not be accessed by others, and
  compromises can often be traced to failures in these guidelines:

  - Choose a secure password.  Change it periodically.
  - Make sure to logout always.
  - Do not leave a machine unattended for long.
  - Make sure no one watches you when you type your password.
  - Avoid password references in email.
  - Be conservative in the use of the .rhost file.
  - Use utilities like `xlock' to protect a station, but be
    considerate.

  Be wary of situations where you think you should supply your
  password.  There are only several basic situations where UNIX
  prompts you for a password: when you are logging in to a system or
  changing your password.  Situations can arise in which prompts for
  passwords are forged by other users, especially in cases where you
  are talking to them (such as Internet Relay Chat).  Also, be  aware
  that forged login screens are one method to illegitimately obtain 
  passwords.


  (Thanks to Jim Mattson <mattson@cs.ucsd.edu> for contributions
  here.)

_____
<2.5> How (in)secure is X Windows?

  X Windows is the primary software developed by the MIT Athena
  project which is funded by U.S. government grants to develop
  applications to harness the power of networks in enhancing
  computational tasks, particularly the human-computer interface. 
  The software implements a client-server interface to a computer via
  graphical windows. In this case the `client' is the application
  requesting or utilizing  graphical resources (such as windows or a
  mouse) and the `server' is the machine that provides them.  In many
  situations the client is an application program running on the same
  machine as the server.

  The great utility of X Windows comes from its complete dissociation
  of the client and server so that windows may be `broadcast' to a
  server at a remote location from the  client. Unfortunately this
  dynamic power also introduces many deep, intricate, and complicated
  security considerations.  The primary security and privacy issue
  associated with X Windows is that much more sensitive data may be
  sent over a network, and over wider regions, than in the case where
  the human is situated near the host computer.  Currently there is
  no encryption of data such as screen updates and keystrokes in X
  Windows.

  Due to either intentional design decisions or unintentional design
  flaws,  early versions of the X Window system are extremely
  insecure. Anyone with an account on the server machine can disrupt
  that display or read it electronically based on access to the
  device unix:0.0 by any regular user.   There are no protections
  from this type of access in these versions.   The problem arises
  because the security is completely based on machine addresses
  rather than users, such that any user at a `trusted' machine is
  himself trusted. Quoting from X documentation (man Xsecurity):
  
  > Any client on a host in the host access control list is allowed
  > access to the X server. This system can work reasonably well in
  > an environment where everyone trusts everyone, or when only a
  > single person can log into a given machine...This system does not
  > work well when multiple people can log in to a single machine and
  > mutual trust does not exist. 
  
  With the access control list, the `xhost' command may prevent some
  naive attempts (i.e. those other than the direct-access unix:0.0
  evasion); the syntax as typed on the host machine is  ``xhost
  +[name]'' where [name] is the domain name or internet address of an
  authorized client machine. By default clients running nonlocal to
  the host are disabled.  Public domain programs to disrupt a display
  momentarily (such as 'flip' or slowly mirror the screen image, or
  cause pixels to 'melt' down to the bottom) have been circulating on
  the internet among hackers for several years and played as pranks
  on unsuspecting or inexperienced users.  Much more serious security
  breaches are conceivable from similar mechanisms exploiting this
  inherent weaknesses.  (The minimal, easily-bypassed `trusted'
  security mode of `xhost' has been jokingly referred to as ``X
  Hanging Open, Security Terrible.''). 

  New versions of the X Windowsystem (X11R5 and higher) by default 
  make server access as secure as the file system using a .Xauthority
  file and 'magic cookies'.  Remote machines must have a code in the
  .Xauthority file in the home directory that matches the code
  allowed by the server.  Many older programs and even new
  vendor-supplied code does not support or is incompatible with
  `magic cookies'. The basic magic cookie mechanism is vulnerable to
  monitoring techniques described earlier because no encryption of
  keys occurs in transmission.  X11R5 also includes other
  sophisticated encryption mechanisms.  Try `man Xsecurity' to find
  out what is supported at your site.  Even though improved security 
  mechanisms have been available in X Windows since ~1990, local
  sites often update this software infrequently because installation
  is extremely complex.


  (Thanks to Marc Vanheyningen <mvanheyn@whale.cs.indiana.edu>, 
  Jim Mattson <mattson@cs.ucsd.edu>, and Bill Marshall
  <marshall@cs.iastate.edu> for contributions here.)

_____
<2.6> How (in)secure is my email?

  By default, not very.  The characters that you are reading are
  almost certainly encoded in ASCII, the American Standard Code for
  Information Interchange that maps alphabetic and symbolic
  characters onto numeric codes and vice versa.  Virtually every
  computer system uses this code, and if not, has ways of converting
  to and from it.  When you write a mail message, by default it is
  being sent in ASCII,  and since the standard is virtually
  universal, there is no intrinsic privacy.  Despite milleniums worth
  of accumulated cryptographic knowledge, cryptographic technologies
  are only recently being established that afford high priority to
  privacy as a primary criteria in computer and network design.  Some
  potential pitfalls in privacy are as follows:

  - The most serious threats are instances of immature or unscrupulous
    system operators reading private mail in the `spool files' at a
    local site (i.e. at the source or destination of the message),
    such as a university. 
  
  - System administrators may also release files to law enforcement
    agencies, but conventions and protocols for warrants involving
    computer searches have still not been strongly established and
    tested legally.

  - Note that bounced messages go to postmasters at a given site in
    their entirety.  This means that if you address mail with an
    incorrect address it has a good chance of being seen by a human
    other than the recipient.

  - Typically new user accounts are always set up such that the local
    mail directory is private, but this is not guaranteed and can be
    overridden.

  - Finally, be aware that some mailing lists (email addresses of 
    everyone on a list) are actually publicly accessable via mail 
    routing software mechanisms.  This `feature' can be disabled.

  Most potential compromises in email privacy can be thoroughly
  avoided with the use of strong end-to-end cryptography, which has
  its own set of caveats (for example, unscrupulous administrators
  may still be a threat if the encryption site is shared or
  nonlocal).  See the sections on ``email privacy'' and ``email
  policies.''

_____
<2.7> How am I (not) liable for my email and postings?

  As punishment or whatever, your system administrator can revoke
  certain `privileges' such as emailing, USENET posting or reading
  certain groups, file transferring, remote communications, or
  generally any subset of capabilities available from your account. 
  This all is completely at the discretion of the local administrator
  and under the procedures followed at a particular site, which in
  many cases are haphazard and crisis-oriented.  Currently there are
  virtually no widespread, uniform guidelines or procedures  for
  restricting use to any internet services, and local administrators
  are free to make arbitrary decisions on access.

  Today punitive measures are regularly applied in various situations.
  In the typical scenario complaint(s) reach a system adminstrator
  regarding abuses by a user, usually but not necessarily preceded by
  complaints to the user in email, regarding that person's
  objectionable email or postings.  `abusive' posters to USENET are
  usually first given admonitions from their system administrators as
  urged by others on the `net'. (The debate persists endlessly on
  many newsgroups whether this is also used  as a questionable means
  of attacking or silencing `harmless crackpots' or censoring
  unpopular opinions.)
  
  System administrators at remote sites  regularly cooperate to
  'squelch' severe cases of abuse.  In general, however, by tradition
  Usenet readers are remarkably tolerant of diverse views and uses of
  the system, but a colorful vocabularly of slang helps describe
  their alternatives when this patience is sapped: the options
  wielded by the individual user are to simply advance to the next
  message (referred to as ``hitting the `n' key''), or  to `plonk'
  annoying posters (according to the Hacker's Dictionary, the sound a
  jerk makes at the end of a fall to the bottom of a kill file).

  In cases where punitive actions are applied, generally system
  administrators are least likely to restrict email.  USENET postings
  are much more commonly restricted, either to individual users or 
  entire groups (such as a university campus).  Restrictions are most
  commonly associated with the following `abuses':

  - harassing or threatening notes, `email terrorism'
  - illegal uses, e.g. piracy or propagation of copyrighted material
  - `ad hominem' attacks, i.e. insulting the reputation of the
    poster instead of citing the content of the message
  - intentional or extreme vulgarity and offensiveness
  - inappropriate postings, esp. binary files in regular groups
    `mail-bombing': inundating mail boxes with numerous or massive
    files

  Major problems originate from lack of distinctions in private and
  official email or postings.  Most users have internet access via
  accounts at businesses or universities and their activities on the
  internet can be construed as representative of their parent
  organizations. Many people put disclaimers in their `signatures' in
  an attempt dissociate their identity and activities from parent
  organizations as a precaution. A recent visible political case
  involves the privacy of electronic mail  written by White House
  staff members of the Bush administration.  Following are some
  guidelines:

  - Acquaint yourself with your company or university policy.
  - If possible, avoid use of your company email address for private
    communication.
  - Use a disclaimer.
  - Keep a low profile (avoid `flamewars' or simply don't post).
  - Avoid posting information that could be  construed to be
    proprietary or `internal'.

  The following references are available from ftp.eff.com
  (see also the section on ``internet use policies''):

  /pub/academic/banned.1991
  /pub/academic/banned.1992
  ---
    Computer material that was banned/challenged in academia in 1991
    and 1992 including USENET hierarchies.

  /pub/academic/cases
  ---
    This is an on-line collection of information about specific
    computers and academic freedom cases. File README is a detailed
    description of the items in the directory.

  /pub/academic/faq/netnews.liability
  ---
    Notes on university liability for Usenet.

_____
<2.8> How do I provide more/less information to others on my identity?

  The public information of your identity and account is mostly
  available though the UNIX utility `finger' described above.  You
  have control over most of this information with the utility `chfn',
  the specifics vary between sites.  You can provide unlimited
  information in the .plan file which is copied directly to the
  destination during the fingering.  (A technique that works at some
  sites allows you to find out who is 'finger'ing you and even to 
  vary the .plan file sent to them.)  Your signature is determined by
  the environment variable SIGNATURE, and USENET signatures are
  usually kept in the .signature file in your home directory.
  
  Providing less information is more difficult and involved.  One
  approach is to ask your system adminstrator to change or delete
  information about you (such as your full name).  You may be able to
  obtain access on a public account or one from someone unrelated to
  you personally.  You may be able to remotely login (via modem or
  otherwise) to computers that you are not physically near.  These
  are tactics for hiding or masking your online activities but
  nothing is foolproof.  Consult man pages on the 'chmod' command and
  the default file mode.  Generally, files on a shared system have
  good safeguards within the user pool but very little protection is
  possible from corrupt system administrators.

  To mask your identity in email or on USENET you can use different
  accounts. More untraceable are new `anonymous posting' and
  remailing services that are very recently being established.  See
  below.

_____
<2.9> Who is my sysadmin?  What does s/he know about me?

  The requirements and screening for getting a system administration
  job (and thereby access to all information on a system) vary widely
  between sites and are sometimes frighteningly lax, especially at
  universities.  Many UNIX systems at universities are largely
  managed by undergraduates with a background in computing and often
  `hacking'.  In general, commercial and industrial sites are more
  strict on qualifications and background, and government sites are
  extremely strict.

  The system adminstrator (root user) can monitor what commands you
  used and at what times.  S/he may have a record (backups) of files
  on your account over a few weeks. S/he can monitor when  you send
  email or post USENET messages, and potentially read either.  S/he
  may have access to records indicating what hosts you are using,
  both locally and elsewhere.  Administrators sometimes employ
  specialized programs to  track `strange' or `unusual' activity,
  which can potentially be misused.

______
<2.10> Why is privacy (un)stable on the internet?

  For the numerous reasons listed above, privacy should not be an
  expectation with current use of the internet.  Furthermore, large
  parts of the internet are funded by the U.S. NSF (National Science
  Foundation) which places certain restrictions on its use (such as
  prohibiting commercial use).  Some high-level officials in this and
  other government agencies may be opposed to emerging techniques to
  guarantee privacy (such as encryption and anonymous services).

  Historically the major threats to privacy on the internet have been
  local. Perhaps the most common example of this are the widespread
  occurrences of university administrators refusing to carry some
  portion of USENET newsgroups labelled as `pornographic'. The
  `alternative' hierarchy in the USENET system, which has virtually
  no restrictions on propagation and new group creation, is
  frequently targeted (although this material may appear anywhere).

  From the global point of view traffic is generally completely
  unimpeded on the internet  and only the most egregious offenders
  are pursued.  For example,  verbatim transcriptions of copyrighted
  material (such as newspaper or magazine articles) are posted to
  USENET with regularity without major consequences (some email
  complaints may ensue).  More astonishing to some is that currently
  significant portions of USENET traffic, and less so internet
  traffic, is comprised of sexually-explicit digitized images almost
  entirely originating from copyrighted material (newsgroups such as
  `alt.sex' regularly have the  highest traffic).
  
______
<2.11> What is the future of privacy on the internet?

  Some argue that the internet currently has an adequate or
  appropriate level of privacy.  Others will argue that as a
  prototype for future global networks it has woefully inadequate
  safeguards.  The internet is growing to become a completely global,
  international superhighway for data, and this traffic will
  inevitably entail data such as voice messages, postal mail, and
  many other items of extremely personal nature. Computer items that
  many people consider completely private (such as their local hard
  drives) will literally be inches from global network connections.
  Also, sensitive industrial and business information is exchanged
  over networks currently and this volume may conceivably merge with
  the internet.
  
  Most would agree that, for these basic but sensitive uses of the
  internet, no significant mechanisms are currently in place to
  ensure much privacy. New standards are calling for uniform
  introduction of `privacy enhanced mail' (PEM) which uses encryption
  technologies to ensure privacy, so that privacy protection is
  automatic, and may significantly improve safeguards.

  The same technology that can be extremely destructive to privacy
  (such as with  surreptitious surveilance) can be overwhelmingly
  effective in protecting  it (e.g. with encryption). Some government
  agencies are opposed to unlimited privacy in general, and believe
  that it should lawfully be forfeited in cases of criminal conduct
  (e.g. court-authorized wiretapping).  However, powerful new
  technologies to protect privacy on computers are becoming
  increasingly popular, provoking some to say that ``the cat is out
  of the bag'' and the ``genie can't be put back in the bottle''.  In
  less idiomatic terms, they believe that the spread of strong
  cryptography is already underway will be socially and technically
  unstoppable.
  
  To date, no feasible system that guarantees both secure
  communication and government oversight has been proposed (the two
  goals are largely incompatible). Proposals for ``registration'' of
  secret keys (by D. Denning on sci.crypt, for example) have been met
  with  hot controversy at best and ridicule and derision at worst,
  mainly because of concerns for the right to privacy and objections
  of inherent feasibility.  Electronic privacy issues, and
  particularly the proper roles of networks and the internet, will
  foreseeably become highly visible and explosive over the next few
  years.


ANONYMITY
=========

_____
<3.1> What is `anonymity' on the internet?

  Simply stated, anonymity is the absence of identity, the ultimate in
  privacy. However, there are several variations on this simple
  theme.  A person may wish to be consistently identified by a
  certain pseudonym or `handle' and establish a reputation under it
  in some area, providing pseudo-anonymity. A person may wish to be
  completely untraceable for a single one-way message (a sort of
  `hit-and-run'). Or, a person may wish to be  openly anonymous but
  carry on a conversation with others (with either known or anonymous
  identities) via an `anonymous return address'.   A user may wish to
  appear as a `regular user' but actually be untraceable.  Sometimes
  a user wishes to hide who he is sending mail to (in addition to the
  message itself). The anonymous item may directed at individuals or
  groups.  A user may wish to access some service and hide all  signs
  of the association. 
  
  All of these uses are feasible on the internet but are currently
  tricky to carry out in practice, because of all the tracking
  mechanisms inherent to operating systems and network protocols. 
  Officials of the NSF and other government agencies may be opposed
  to any of these uses because of the potential for abuse. 
  Nevertheless, the inherent facelessness of large networks will
  always guarantee a certain element of anonymity.

_____
<3.2> Why is `anonymity' (un)important on the internet?

  Anonymity is another powerful tool that can be beneficial or
  problematic depending on its use.  Arguably absence of
  identification is important as the presence of it.  It may be the
  case that many strong benefits from electronic anonymity will be
  discovered that were unforeseen and unpredicted, because true
  anonymity has been historically very difficult to establish.

  One can use anonymity to make personal statements to a colleague
  that would sabotage a relationship if stated openly (such as
  employer/employee scenarios).  One can use it to pass information
  and evade any threat of direct retribution.  For example,
  `whistleblowers' reporting on government abuses (economic, social,
  or  political) can bring issues to light without fear of stigma or
  retaliation. Sensitive, personal, potentially damaging information
  is often posted to some USENET groups, a risky situation where
  anonymity allows conversations to be carried on completely
  independent of the identities of the participants.  Some police
  departments run phone services that allow anonymous reporting of
  crimes; such uses would be straightforward on the network.
  Unfortunately, extortion and harassment become more insidious with
  assurances of anonymity.

_____
<3.3> How can anonymity be protected on the internet?

  The chief means, as alluded to above, are masking identities in
  email and posting. However, anonymous accounts (public accounts as
  accessable and anonymous as e.g. public telephones) may be
  effective as well, but this use is generally not officially
  supported and even discouraged by some system adminstrators and NSF
  guidelines.  The nonuniformity in the requirements of obtaining
  accounts at different sites and institutions makes anonymous
  accounts generally difficult to obtain to the public at large.

  Many communications protocols are inherently detrimental to
  anonymity.  Virtually every protocol in existence currently
  contains information on both sender and receiver in every packet.
  New communications protocols will likely develop that guarantee
  much higher degrees of secure anonymous communication.

_____
<3.4> How do I send anonymous mail?

  One approach has been to set up an `anonymous server' that, when
  activated by email to its address, responds by allocating and
  supplying an `anonymous ID' that is unique to the person requesting
  it (based on his email address).  This will vary for the same
  person for different machine address email originations. To send
  anonymous mail, the user sends email directed to the server
  containing the final destination. The server `anonymizes' the
  message by stripping of identification information and forwards the
  message, which appears to originate from the anonymous server only
  from the corresponding anonymous user id.  This is the
  `interactive' use of anonymity or pseudonymity mentioned above.

  Another more `fringe' approach is to run a `cypherpunk' remailer
  from a regular user account (no root system privileges are
  required). These are currently being pioneered by  Eric Hughes and
  Hal Finney <hal@alumni.caltech.edu>. The operator runs a process on
  a machine that anonymizes mail sent to him with certain
  characteristics that distinguish it from his regular incoming mail
  (typically fields in the header). One has been implemented as a 
  PERL script running on UNIX.  Several of these are in existence
  currently but sites and software currently are highly unstable;
  they may be in operation outside of system administrator knowledge.
  The remailers don't generally support anonymous return addresses. 
  Mail that is incorrectly addressed is received by the operator. 
  Generally the user of the remailer has to disavow any
  responsibility for the messages forwarded through his system,
  although actually may be held liable regardless.

  These approaches have several serious disadvantages and weaknesses:
  
  - The anonymous server approach requires maintaining a mapping of
    anonymous ID's to real addresses that must be maintained
    indefinitely.  One alternative is to allow `deallocation' of
    aliases at the request of the user, but this has not been
    implemented yet.

  - Although an unlikely scenario, traffic to any of these sites could
    conceivably be monitored from the `outside', necessitating the
    use of cryptography for basic protection,.

  - Local administrators can shut them down either out of caprice or
    under pressure from local, network, or government agencies.
  
  - Unscrupulous providers of the services can monitor the traffic
    that goes through them.

  - Most remailers currently keep logs that may be inspected. 

  - The cypherpunk approach tends to be highly unstable because these
    operators are basically  network users who do not own the
    equipment and are accountable  to their own system
    administrators, who may be unaware of the use and unsympathetic
    to the philosophy of anonymity when the operation is discovered,
    regarding it as illicit use. 

  - In all cases, a high degree of trust is placed in the anonymous
    server operator by the user.

  Currently the most direct route to anonymity involves using SMTP
  protocols to submit a message directly to a server with arbitrary
  field information.  This practice, not uncommon to hackers, and the
  approach used by remailers, is generally viewed with hostility by
  most system administrators.  Information in the header routing data
  and logs of network port connection information may be retained
  that can be used to track the originating site.  In practice, this
  is generally infeasible and rarely carried out.  Some
  administrators on the network will contact local administrators to
  request a message be tracked and its writer admonished or punished
  more severely (such as revoking the account), all of this actually
  happening occasionally but infrequently.

  See the sections ``known anonymous mail and posting sites'' and 
  ``responsibilities associated with anonymity''.

_____
<3.5> How do I post anonymously?

  For this use anonymous servers have been established as well with
  all the  associated caveats above (monitored traffic, capricious or
  risky local circumstances, logging).  Make sure to test the system
  at least once by e.g. anonymous posting to misc.test (however some
  operators don't recommend this because many sites `autorespond' to
  test messages, possibly  causing the anonymous server to allocate
  anonymous IDs for those machines).  See the  ``responsibilties
  associated with anonymous posting'' before proceeding.

  Another direct route involves using NNTP protocols to submit a
  message directly to a newserver with arbitrary field information.
  This practice, not uncommon to hackers, is also generally viewed
  with hostility by most system administrators, and similar
  consequences can ensue.

  See the sections ``known anonymous mail and posting sites'' and 
  ``responsibilities associated with anonymity''.

_____
<3.6> How do I `kill' anonymous postings?

  > Try putting this in your kill file:
  >   
  >   /Anon/h:j
  >   /Anonymous/h:j
  > 
  > This will search the headers of the messages and kill any that
  > contain `Anon' or `Anonymous' in them.  Not perfect and won't
  > kill followups. 
  
  --James Thomas Green <jgreen@zeus.calpoly.edu>

_____
<3.7> What are the responsibilities associated with anonymity?

  
  Users
  -----

  - Use anonymity only if you have to. Frivolous uses weaken the
    seriousness and usefulness of the capability for others.
  - Do not use anonymity to provoke, harass, or threaten others.
  - Do not hide behind anonymity to evade established conventions on
    Usenet,  such as posting binary pictures to regular newsgroups.
  - If posting large files, be attentive to bandwidth considerations.
    Remember, simply sending the posting to the service increases
    network traffic.
  - Avoid posting anonymously to the regular hierarchy of Usenet; this
    is the mostly likely place to alienate readers. The `alt'
    hierarchy is preferred.
  - Give as much information as possible in the posting (i.e.
    references, etc.) Remember that content is the only means for
    readers to judge the truth of the message, and that any
    inaccuracies will tend to discredit the entire message and even
    future ones under the same handle.
  - Be careful not to include information that will reveal your
    identity or enable someone to deduce it.  Test the system by
    sending anonymized mail to yourself.
  - Be aware of the policies of the anonymous site and respect them. 
    Be prepared to forfeit your anonymity if you abuse the privilege.
  - Be considerate and respectful of other's objections to anonymity.
  - ``Hit-and-run'' anonymity should be used with utmost reservation.
    Use services that provide anonymous return addresses instead.
  - Be courteous to the system operator, who may have invested large
    amounts of time, be personally risking his account, or dedicating
    his hardware, all for your convenience.

  Operators
  ---------

  - Document thoroughly acceptable and unacceptable uses in an
    introductory file that is sent to new users.  Have a coherent and
    consistent policy and stick to it. State clearly what logging and
    monitoring is occurring. Describe your background, interest, and
    security measures. Will the general approach be totalitarian or
    lassaiz-faire?
  - Formulate a plan for problematic ethical situations and anticipate
    potentially intense moral quandaries and dilemmas. What if a user
    is blackmailing someone through your service? What if a user
    posts suicidal messages through your service? Remember, your
    users trust you to protect them.
  - In the site introductory note, give clear examples  of situations
    where you will take action and what these actions will be (e.g.
    warn the user, limit anonymity to email or posting only, revoke
    the account, 'out' the user, contact local administrator, etc.)
  - Describe exactly the limitations of the software and hardware.
    Address the bandwidth limitations of your site. Report candidly
    and thoroughly all bugs that have  occurred.  Work closely with
    users to isolate and fix bugs. Address all bugs noted below under
    ``(in)stability of anonymity''.
  - Document the stability of the site---how long has it been running?
    What compromises have occured? Why are you running it? What is
    your commitment to it?
  - Include a disclaimer in outgoing mail and messages.  Include an
    address for complaints, ideally appended to every outgoing item. 
    Consult a lawyer about your liability.
  - Be committed to the long-term stability of the site. Be prepared
    to deal with complaints and `hate mail' addressed to you.  If you
    do not own the hardware the system runs on or are not the system
    adminstrator, consult those who do and are.
  - Be considerate of providing anonymity to various groups.  If
    possible, query group readers.
  - Keep a uniformity and simplicity of style in outgoing message
    format that can be screened effectively by kill files.  Ensure
    the key text `Anon' is  somewhere in every header.
  - Take precautions to ensure the security of the server from
    physical and  network-based attacks and infiltrations.

  Readers
  -------
  
  - Do not complain, attack, or discredit  a poster for the sole
    reason that he is posting anonymously, make blanket condemnations
    that equate anonymity with cowardice, or assail anonymous traffic
    in general for mostly neutral reasons (e.g. its volume is heavy
    or increasing).
  - React to the anonymous information unemotionally.  Abusive posters
    will be encouraged further if they get irrationally irate
    responses.  Sometimes the most effective response is silence.
  - Notify operators if very severe abuses occur, such as piracy,
    harassment, extortion, etc.
  - Do not complain about postings being inappropriate because they
    offend you personally.
  - Use kill files to screen anonymous postings if you object to the
    idea of anonymity itself.
  - Avoid the temptation to proclaim that all anonymous postings
    should be barred from particular groups because no `possible' or
    `conceivable' need exists.

  References
  ----------
  
  See e.g. ftp.eff.org:/pub/academic/anonymity:

  > This article is an excerpt from an issue of FIDONEWS on individual
  > privacy and the use of handles.  It accepts the need of a system
  > operator to know the name of a user; but suggests that the use of
  > a handle is analogous to a request to withhold the name in a
  > letter to the editor. The article concludes with a set of
  > guidelines for preserving the right to be anonymous.

_____
<3.8> Why is anonymity (un)stable on the internet?

  As noted, many factors compromise the anonymity currently available
  to the general internet community, and these services should be
  used with great caution.  To summarize, the technology is in its
  infancy and current approaches are unrefined, unreliable, and not
  completely trustworthy.  No standards have been established and
  troubling situations of loss of anonymity and bugs in the software
  are prevalent.  Here are some encountered and potential bugs: 
  
  - One  anonymous remailer reallocated already allocated anonymous
    return addresses. 
  - Others passed signature information embedded in messages
    unaltered. 
  - Address resolution problems resulting in anonymized mail bounced
    to a remailer are common.
  - Forgeries to the anonymous server itself are a problem,  possibly
    allowing unauthorized users to potentially glean anon ID - email
    address  mappings in the alias file.  This can be remedied with
    the use of passwords.
  - Infinite mail loops are possible with chaining remailers.
  
  Source code is being distributed, tested, and refined for these
  systems, but standards are progressing slowly and weakly.  The
  field is not likely to improve considerably without  official
  endorsement and action by network agencies.  The whole idea is
  essentially still in its infancy and viewed with suspicion and
  distrust by many on the internet, seen as illegitimate or favorable
  to criminality.  The major objection to anonymity over regular
  internet use  is the perceived lack of accountability to system
  operators, i.e. invulnerability to account restrictions resulting
  from outside complaints.  System adminstrators at some sites have
  threatened to filter anonymous news postings generated by the
  prominent servers from their redistribution flows.  This may only
  have the effect of encouraging server operators to create less
  characteristically detectable headers.  Probably the least
  problematic approach, and the most traditional to Usenet, is for
  individual users to deal with anonymous mail however they prefer,
  e.g. ignoring it or filtering it with kill files.
  
_____
<3.9> What is the future of anonymity on the internet?

  New anonymous protocols effectively serve to significantly increase
  safeguards of anonymity.  For example, the same mechanism that
  routes email over multiple hosts, thereby threatening its privacy,
  can also be used to guarantee it. In a scheme called `chaining' an
  anonymous message is passed through multiple anonymous servers
  before reaching a destination.  In this way generally multiple
  links of the chain have to be `broken' for security to be
  compromised. Re-encryption at each link makes this scenario even
  more unlikely.  Even more significantly the anonymous remailers
  could be spread over the internet globally so that local weaknesses
  (such as corrupt governments or legal wiretapping within a nation)
  would be more unlikely to sacrifice overall security by message
  tracing. However, remailers run by corrupt operators are possible.
  
  The future of anonymous services on the internet is, at this time,
  highly uncertain and fraught with peril. While specific groups seem
  to benefit significantly from anonymous posting capabilities, many
  feel that unlimited newsgroup scope for anonymous posting is a
  disruptive and dangerous idea and detracts from discussions in
  `serious' groups.   The introduction of unlimited group anonymity
  may have fundamental repercussions on Usenet conventions and
  distribution mechanisms such as moderated and `alt' groups have had
  in the past. For example, as part of new group creation, the
  charter may specify whether `anonymous' posting is (un)welcome.
  
  Nevertheless, the widespread introduction and use of anonymity may
  be inevitable. Based on traffic statistics, anonymous services are
  in huge demand. Pervasive and readily available anonymity could
  carry significant and unforeseen social consequences.  However, if
  its use is continued to be generally regarded as subversive it may
  be confined to the underground.  The ramifications widespread
  introduction of anonymity to Usenet are still largely unknown. It
  is unclear whether it will provoke signficant amounts of new
  traffic or, instead of expansion, cause a shift where a greater
  portion of existing traffic anonymized.  Conceivably the services
  could play a role in influencing future mainstream social
  acceptance of Usenet.


* * *

This is Part 1 of the Privacy & Anonymity FAQ, obtained via anonymous
  FTP to pit-manager@mit.edu:/pub/usenet/news.answers/net-privacy/ or 
  newsgroups news.answers, sci.answers, alt.answers every 21 days.
Written by L. Detweiler <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>.
All rights reserved.

Path: senator-bedfellow.mit.edu!senator-bedfellow.mit.edu!usenet
From: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.privacy,alt.answers,sci.answers,news.answers
Subject: Privacy & Anonymity on the Internet FAQ
Followup-To: poster
Date: 16 Feb 1993 06:03:31 GMT
Organization: TMP Enterprises
Lines: 1538
Approved: news-answers-request@MIT.Edu
Expires: 23 Mar 1993 06:02:09 GMT
Message-ID: <net-privacy/part2_729842529@athena.mit.edu>
References: <net-privacy/part1_729842529@athena.mit.edu>
Reply-To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
NNTP-Posting-Host: pit-manager.mit.edu
Summary: Email and account privacy, anonymous mailing and posting,
 file encryption, academic computer policies, relevant legislation
 and references, EFF, and other privacy and rights issues associated
 with use of the Internet and global networks in general.
X-Last-Updated: 1993/02/16
Xref: senator-bedfellow.mit.edu sci.crypt:13748 alt.privacy:5904 alt.answers:29 sci.answers:34 news.answers:6018

Archive-name: net-privacy/part2
Last-modified: 1993/2/15
Version: 2.0



IDENTITY, PRIVACY, and ANONYMITY on the INTERNET
================================================

(c) 1993 L. Detweiler.  Not for commercial use except by permission
from author, otherwise may be freely copied.  Not to be altered. 
Please credit if quoted.

SUMMARY
=======

Email and account privacy, file encryption, academic computer
policies, relevant legislation and references, EFF, and other privacy
and rights issues associated with use of the Internet and global
networks in general.

(Search for <#.#> for exact section. Search for '_' (underline) for
next section.)

PART 2
====== (this file)

Resources
---------

<4.1> What UNIX programs are related to privacy?
<4.2> What are some known remailing and posting sites?
<4.3> How can I learn about or use cryptography?
<4.4> What is the cypherpunks mailing list?
<4.5> What are some privacy-related newsgroups?  FAQs?
<4.6> What is internet Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM)?
<4.7> What are other Request For Comments (RFCs) related to privacy?
<4.8> How can I run an anonymous remailer?
<4.9> What are references on privacy in email?
<4.10> What are some email, Usenet, and internet use policies?
<4.11> What is the MIT ``CROSSLINK'' anonymous message TV program?

Miscellaneous
-------------

<5.1> What is ``digital cash''?
<5.2> What is a ``hacker'' or ``cracker''?
<5.3> What is a ``cypherpunk''?
<5.4> What is an anonymous pool?
<5.5> What is `security through obscurity'?
<5.6> What are `identity daemons'?
<5.7> What is the history behind anonymous posting servers?
<5.8> What standards are needed to guard electronic privacy?

Issues
------

<6.1> What is the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF)?
<6.2> What is `operation Sun Devil' and the Steve Jackson Game case?
<6.3> What is Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN)?
<6.4> What is the National Research and Education Network (NREN)?
<6.5> What is the FBI's proposed Digital Telephony Act?
<6.6> What other U.S. legislation is related to privacy on networks?
<6.7> What are references on rights in cyberspace?
<6.8> What is the Computers and Academic Freedom (CAF) archive?
<6.9> What is the background behind the Internet?
<6.10> How is Internet `anarchy' like the English language?

Footnotes
---------

<7.1> Most Wanted list
<7.2> Change history

* * *


RESOURCES
=========


_____
<4.1> What UNIX programs are related to privacy?

  For more information, type `man [cmd]' or `apropos [keyword]' at the
  UNIX shell prompt.

    finger - obtain information about a remote user
    chfn   - change information about yourself obtainable by remote
             users
    chmod  - change the rights associated with a file or directory
    umask  - (shell) change the default (on creation) file access
             rights
    ls     - list the rights associated with files and directories
    xhost  - allow or disable access control of particular users to an
             Xwindow server
    last   - list the latest user logins on the system and their
             originations
    who    - list other users, login/idle times, originations
    w      - list other users and what they are running
    xhost  - access control list for X Window client use
    xauth  - control X Window server authentication
    
    .signature  - file in the home directory appended to USENET posts
    .forward    - file used to forward email to other accounts
    .Xauthority - file used for X Window server authentication keys
    $SIGNATURE  - variable used for name in email and USENET postings


_____
<4.2> What are some known anonymous remailing and posting sites?


  anon.penet.fi
  -------------
    Anonymized mail, posting, and return addresses (no encryption).  
    Send mail to help@penet.fi for information.

  ebrandt@jarthur.claremont.edu
  -----------------------------
    Anonymized mail.  Request information from above address.
    
  elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu
  -------------------------
    Experimental anonymous remailer run Karl Barrus
    <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU>, with encryption to server.  Send to the
    site name a message with the following text:
    
      ::
      command: help
      
      user@host
    
    where `user@host' is the return address.

  hal@alumni.caltech.edu
  ----------------------
    Experimental remailer with encryption to server and return
    addresses.  Request information from above address.

  hh@soda.berkeley.edu
  hh@cicada.berkeley.edu
  hh@pmantis.berkeley.edu
  ----------------------
    Experimental remailer.  Include header `Request-Remailing-To'.

   nowhere@bsu-cs.bsu.edu 
  ----------------------
    Experimental remailer allowing one level of chaining.  Run by
    Chael Hall.  Request information from above address.

  phantom@mead.u.washington.edu 
  -----------------------------
    Experimental remailer with encryption to server.  `finger' site
    address for information.

  Notes:

  - Currently the most stable of anonymous remailing and posting
    sites is probably anon.penet.fi operated by julf@penet.fi for
    several months, who has system adminstrator privileges and owns
    the equipment.
  
  - So far, all encryption is based on public-key cryptography and PGP
    software (see the question on cryptography). 

  - Encryption aspects (message text, destination address, replies)
    vary between sites.

  - Multiple chaining, alias unlinking, and address encryption are
    mostly unsupported at this time.

_____
<4.3> How can I learn about or use cryptography?

  A general introduction to mostly theoretical cryptographic issues,
  especially those frequently discussed in sci.crypt, is available
  in FAQ form:

  >  Compiled by:
  >        cme@ellisun.sw.stratus.com (Carl Ellison)
  >        Gwyn@BRL.MIL (Doug Gwyn)
  >        smb@ulysses.att.com (Steven Bellovin)

  NIST (U.S. National Institute for Standards and Technology)
  publishes an introductory paper on cryptography, special
  publication 800-2 ``Public-Key Cryptograhy'' by James Nechvatal
  (April 1991).  Available via anonymous FTP from
  csrc.ncsl.nist.gov (129.6.54.11), file pub/nistpubs/800-2.txt. 
  Also via available anonymous FTP from wimsey.bc.ca as crypt.txt.Z
  in the crypto directory.  Covers technical mathematical aspects
  of encryption such as number theory.

  More general information can be found in a FAQ by Paul Fahn of RSA
  Labortories via anonymous FTP from rsa.com in /pub/faq.ps.Z.  See
  the `readme' file for information on the `tex' version.  Also
  available as hardcopy for $20 from   RSA Laboratories, 100 Marine
  Parkway, Redwood City, CA  94065.  Send questions to
  faq-editor@rsa.com.

  Phil Zimmerman's PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) public-domain package
  for public key encryption is available at numerous sites, and is
  in widespread use over the internet for general UNIX-based file
  encryption (including email).  Consult the archie FTP database. 
  Also see the newsgroup alt.security.pgp.  Mailing list requests
  to info-pgp-request@lucpul.it.luc.edu.

  From the RIPEM FAQ by Marc VanHeyningen
  <mvanheyn@whale.cs.indiana.edu> on news.answers:

  > RIPEM is a program which performs Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM)
  > using the cryptographic techniques of RSA and DES.  It allows
  > your electronic mail to have the properties of authentication
  > (i.e. who sent it can be confirmed) and privacy (i.e. nobody can
  > read it except the intended recipient.)
  > 
  > RIPEM was written primarily by Mark Riordan
  > <mrr@scss3.cl.msu.edu>. Most of the code is in the public domain,
  > except for the RSA routines, which are a library called RSAREF
  > licensed from RSA Data Security Inc.
  > 
  > RIPEM is available via anonymous FTP to citizens and permanent
  > residents in the U.S. from rsa.com; cd to rsaref/ and read the
  > README file for info.
  > 
  > RIPEM, as well as some other crypt stuff, has its `home site' on
  > rpub.cl.msu.edu, which is open to non-anonymous FTP for users in
  > the U.S. and Canada who are citizens or permanent residents.  To
  > find out how to obtain access, ftp there, cd to pub/crypt/, and
  > read the file GETTING_ACCESS.

  Note: cryptography is generally not well integrated into email yet
  and some system proficiency is required by users to utilize it.

_____
<4.4> What is the cypherpunks mailing list?

  Eric Hughes <hughes@toad.com> runs the `cypherpunk' mailing list
  dedicated to ``discussion about technological defenses for privacy
  in the digital domain.''  Send email to
  cypherpunks-request@toad.com to be added or subtracted from the
  list. From the charter:

  > The most important means to the defense of privacy is encryption.
  > To encrypt is to indicate the desire for privacy.  But to encrypt
  > with weak cryptography is to indicate not too much desire for
  > privacy. Cypherpunks hope that all people desiring privacy will
  > learn how best to defend it.

_____
<4.5> What are some privacy-related newsgroups?  FAQs?
  
  Newsgroups
  ==========

  alt.comp.acad-freedom.news
  alt.comp.acad-freedom.talk 
  --------------------------
    Moderated and unmoderated issues related to academic freedom and
    privacy at universities. Documented examples of violated
    privacy in e.g. email.  Documented examples of `censorship' as
    in e.g. limiting USENET groups local availability.

  alt.cyberpunks
  --------------
    Virtual reality, (science) fiction by William Gibson and Bruce 
    Sterling, cyberpunk in the mainstream.
 
  alt.hackers
  -----------
    USENET Network News Transfer Protocol (NNTP) posting mechanisms, 
    Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), `obligatory hack' reports.

  alt.privacy
  -----------
    General privacy issues involving taxpaying, licensing, social
    security numbers, etc.
  
  alt.security 
  comp.security.misc
  ------------------
    Computer related security issues.  FAQ in news.answers below.
  
  alt.security.pgp
  ----------------
    Dedicated to discussing PGP, or ``Pretty Good Privacy'' Software
    developed by Phil Zimmerman for public key encryption.
  
  comp.society.privacy
  --------------------
    Privacy issues associated with computer technologies.  Examples:
    caller identification, social security numbers, credit
    applications, mailing lists, etc.  Moderated.
    
  comp.eff.news
  comp.eff.talk
  -------------
    Moderated and unmoderated groups associated with the Electronic
    Frontier Foundation started by Mitch Kapor for protecting civil
    and constitutional rights in the electronic realm.
  
  news.admin
  news.admin.policy
  -----------------
    Concerns of news administrators.  NNTP standards and mechanisms.
    
  news.lists
  ----------
    USENET traffic distributions.  Most frequent posters, most
    voluminous groups, most active sites, etc.
  
  sci.crypt
  ---------
    Considers scientific and social issues of cryptography. 
    Examples: legitimate use of PGP, public-key patents, DES,
    cryptographic security, cypher breaking, etc.
  

  FAQs
  ====

  FAQs or ``Frequently-Asked Questions'' are available in the
  newsgroups *.answers or via anonymous FTP to
  pit-manager.mit.edu [18.172.1.27] (also rtfm.mit.edu) 
  from the directory
  /pub/usenet/news.answers/[x] where [x] is the archive name.
  This FAQ is archived in the file `net-privacy'.  
  Others are:

  network-info/part1  
  ------------------
    Sources of information about the Internet and how to connect to
    it, through the NSF or commercial vendors.
  
  alt-security-faq
  ----------------
    Computer related security issues arising in alt.security and
    comp.security.misc, mostly UNIX related.
  
  ssn-privacy 
  -----------
    Privacy issues associated with the use of the U.S. Social
    Security number (SSN).
  
  pdial
  -----
    Public dialup internet accounts list.
  
  college-email/part1
  -------------------
    How to find email addresses for undergraduate and graduate
    students, faculty and staff at various colleges and
    universities.
  
  ripem/faq
  ---------
    Information on RIPEM, a program for public key mail encryption
    officially sanctioned by Public Key Partners Inc., the company
    that owns patents on public key cryptography.
  
  unix-faq/faq/part1
  ------------------
    Frequently-asked questions about UNIX, including information on
    `finger' and terminal spying.

  distributions/*
  ---------------
     Known geographic, university, and network distributions.

_____
<4.6> What is internet Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM)?

  Internet drafts on Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM) describe a standard
  under revision for six years delineating the official protocols for
  email encryption.  The standard has only recently stabilized and
  implementations are being developed.

  - RFC-1421: ``Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: 
    Part I: Message Encryption and Authentication Procedures.'' J.
    Linn <104-8456@mcimail.com>

  - RFC-1422: ``Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part
    II: Certificate-Based Key Management'' S. Kent <Kent@BBN.com>

  - RFC-1424: ``Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: 
    Part IV: Key Certification and Related Services'' B. Kaliski
    <burt@rsa.com>

  - RFC-1423: ``Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part
    III: Algorithms, Modes, and Identifiers'' D. Balenson
    <belenson@tis.com>

  Send email to pem-info@tis.com for more information.  See ``RFCs 
  related to privacy'' for information on how to obtain RFCs.
  
_____
<4.7> What are other Requests For Comments (RFCs) related to privacy?

  RFC-822:  SMTP, Simple Mail Transfer Protocol
  RFC-977:  NNTP, Network News Transfer Protocol
  RFC-1036: Standard for interchange of network news messages
  RFC-1208: Glossary of Networking Terms
  RFC-1207: FYI: Answers to commonly asked ``experienced Internet
            user'' questions
  RFC-1206: FYI: Answers to commonly asked ``new Internet user''
            questions
  RFC-1355: Privacy and Accuracy issues in Network Information center
            databases

  RFC-1177
  --------
    FYI: Answers to commonly asked ``new internet user'' questions. 

    Basic terminology on the Internet (TCP/IP, SMTP, FTP). Internet 
    organizations such as IAB (Internet Activities Board) and IETF 
    (Internet Enbgineering Task Force).  Glossary of terms.  Also 
    ftp.eff.org:/pub/internet-info/internet.q


  From RFC-1177:

  > RFCs can be obtained via FTP from NIC.DDN.MIL, with the pathname
  > RFC:RFCnnnn.TXT or RFC:RFCnnnn.PS (where `nnnn' refers to the
  > number of the RFC).  Login with FTP, username `anonymous' and
  > password `guest'.  The NIC also provides an automatic mail
  > service for those sites which cannot use FTP.  Address the
  > request to SERVICE@NIC.DDN.MIL and in the subject field of the
  > message indicate the RFC number, as in `Subject: RFC nnnn' (or
  > `Subject: RFC nnnn.PS' for PostScript RFCs).
  >
  > RFCs can also be obtained via FTP from NIS.NSF.NET.  Using FTP,
  > login with username `anonymous' and password `guest'; then
  > connect to the RFC directory (`cd RFC').  The file name is of the
  > form RFCnnnn.TXT-1 (where `nnnn' refers to the number of the
  > RFC).  The NIS also provides an automatic mail service for those
  > sites which cannot use FTP.  Address the request to
  > NIS-INFO@NIS.NSF.NET and leave the subject field of the message
  > blank.  The first line of the text of the message must be `SEND
  > RFCnnnn.TXT-1', where nnnn is replaced by the RFC number.
  
_____
<4.8> How can I run an anonymous remailer?

  Cypherpunk remailer source is at soda.berkeley.edu in the
  /pub/cypherpunks directory.  It's written in PERL, and is
  relatively easy to install (no administrative rights are required).
   Karl Barrus  <elee9sf@menudo.uh.edu> has more information and
  modifications. Also, most remailer operators mentioned above are
  amenable to discussing features, problems, and helping new sites
  become operational. Address all points in the section
  ``responsibities of anonymous use'' in this document prior to
  advertising your service.

_____
<4.9> What are references on privacy in email?


  Brown, Bob. ``EMA Urges Users to Adopt Policy on E-mail Privacy.''  
  Network World (Oct 29, 1990), 7.44: 2.
  
  Bairstow, Jeffrey. ``Who Reads your Electronic Mail?'' Electronic
  Business  (June 11, 1990) 16 (11): 92.

  ftp.eff.org
  ===========

  /pub/eff/papers/email_privacy
  ---
    Article on the rights of email privacy. by Ruel T. Hernandez.

  /pub/academic/law/privacy.email
  ---
    ``Computer Electronic Mail and Privacy'', an edited version of a
    law school seminar paper by Ruel T. Hernadez.

  /pub/eff/papers/email-privacy-biblio-2
  ---
    Compilation of bibliography on E-Mail and its privacy issues (part
    2 of the work).  Compiled by Stacy B. Veeder (12/91).

  /pub/eff/papers/email-privacy-research
  ---
    The author at Digital Research tried to formalize their employee
    privacy policy on E-Mail.  The casesightings are divided into two
    groups: US Constitutional law, and California law.

  /pub/eff/papers/company-email
  ---
    Formulating a Company Policy on Access to and Disclosure of
    Electronic Mail on Company Computer Systems by David R. Johnson
    and John Podesta for the Electronic Mail Assocation

  /pub/cud/alcor
  ---
    Information on Alcor Co., an e-mail privacy suit.

  /pub/academic/law/privacy.email
  ---
    Email privacy search at Berkeley.

______
<4.10> What are some email, Usenet, and internet use policies?

  The Computer Policy and Critiques Archive is a collection of the
  computer policies of many schools and networks, run by the
  Computers and Academic Freedom group on the Electronic Frontier
  Foundation FTP site. The collection also includes critiques of some
  of the policies.

  > If you have gopher, the archive is browsable with the command:
  > gopher -p academic/policies gopher.eff.org
  > 
  > The archive is also accessible via anonymous ftp and email. Ftp
  > to ftp.eff.org (192.88.144.4). It is in directory
  > `pub/academic/policies'. For email access, send email to
  > archive-server@eff.org. Include the line:
  > 
  > send acad-freedom/policies <filenames>
  > 
  > where <filenames> is a list of the files that you want. File
  > README is a detailed description of the items in the directory.
  > 
  > For more information, to make contributions, or to report typos
  > contact J.S. Greenfield (greeny@eff.org). Directory `widener'
  > contains additional policies (but not critiques).


  ftp.eff.org
  ===========
  
  /pub/cud/networks
  ---
    Acceptable Use Policies for various networks, including CompuServe
    (file `compuserve'), NSFNET (file `nsfnet') with information on
    research and commercial uses. See /pub/cud/networks/index.

  /pub/cud/networks/email
  ---
    Policies from various sysadmins about how they handle the issue of
    email privacy,  control, and abuse, compiled by T. Hooper 
    <hooper_ta@cc.curtin.edu.au>.
  
  /pub/cud/schools/
  ---
    Computer use policies of a number of schools. See schools/Index
    for a full list and description.

  
  Commentary
  ==========

  /pub/academic/faq/policy.best
  ---
    Opinions on the best academic computer policies.


  /pub/academic/faq/email.policies
  ---
    Do any universities treat email and computer files as private?

  /pub/academic/faq/netnews.writing
  ---
    Policies on what users write on Usenet.

  /pub/academic/faq/netnews.reading
  ---
    Policies on what users read on Usenet: should my university remove
    (or restrict) Netnews newsgroups because some people find them
    offensive?

  /pub/academic/faq/policy
  ---
    What guidance is there for creating or evaluating a university's
    academic computer policy?

______
<4.11> What is the MIT ``CROSSLINK'' anonymous message TV program?

  > CROSSLINK is an anonymous message system run on MIT Student
  > Cable TV-36. It provides an anonymous medium through which MIT
  > students can say those things they might otherwise find
  > difficult, inconvenient or impossible to say in person.  It's
  > also a way to send fun or totally random messages to your
  > friends over the air.  It is similar to the anonymous message
  > pages found in many college newspapers, except that it's
  > electronic in nature and it's free.

  Messages can be posted to the service via email.  For more
  information send email to crosslink@athena.mit.edu.


MISCELLANEOUS
=============

_____
<5.1> What is ``digital cash''?

  With digital encryption and authentication technologies, the
  possibility of a widespread digital cash system may someday be
  realized.  A system utilizing codes sent between users and banks
  (similar to today's checking system except entirely digital) may
  be one approach.  The issues of cryptography, privacy, and
  anonymity are closely associated with transfer of cash in an
  economy.  See the article in Scientific American by David Chaum
  (~Dec.1992).

  An experimental digital bank is run by Karl Barrus
  <elee9sf@Menudo.UH.EDU> based on suggestions by Hal Finney on the
  cypherpunks mailing list.  To use the server send mail to
  elee7h5@rosebud.ee.uh.edu message with the following text:

    ::
    command: help
    
    user@host

  where `user@host' is your email address.
  
_____
<5.2> What is a ``hacker'' or ``cracker''?

  These terms arouse strong feelings by many on their meaning,
  especially on the internet.  In the general news media in the past
  a person who uses computers and networks to malicious ends (such as
  breaking into systems) has been referred to as a hacker, but most
  internet users prefer the term ``cracker'' for this.  Instead, a
  ``hacker'' is perceived as a benign but intensely ambitious,
  curious, and driven computer user who explores obscure areas of a
  system, for example---something of a proud electronic pioneer and
  patriot.  This is the sense intended in this document.  See also
  the ``Hacker's Dictionary'' and the FAQ `alt-security-faq'.
 

_____
<5.3> What is a ``cypherpunk''?

  From the charter of the cypherpunk mailing list:

  > Cypherpunks assume privacy is a good thing and wish there were
  > more of it.  Cypherpunks acknowledge that those who want privacy
  > must create it for themselves and not expect governments,
  > corporations, or other large, faceless organizations to grant
  > them privacy out of beneficence.  Cypherpunks know that people
  > have been creating their own privacy for centuries with whispers,
  > envelopes, closed doors, and couriers.  Cypherpunks do not seek
  > to prevent other people from speaking about their experiences or
  > their opinions.

  See information on the cypherpunk mailing list below.

  See also the CryptoAnarchist Manifesto and the Cryptography Glossary
  in soda.berkeley.edu:/pub/cypherpunks.

_____
<5.4> What is an anonymous pool?

  Closely associated with encryption is `steganography' or the
  techniques for not only pursuing private (encrypted) communication
  but concealing the very  existence of the communication itself. 
  Many new possibilities in this area are introduced with the
  proliferation of computer technology.  For example, it is possible
  to encode messages in the least-significant bits of images,
  typically the most 'noisy'. In addition, when such an item is
  posted in a public place (such as a newsgroup), virtually
  untraceable  communication can take place between sender and
  receiver.  For  steganographic communications in the electronic
  realm one another possibility is setting up a mailing list where
  individual messages get broadcast to the entire list and individual
  users decode particular messages with their unique key.   An
  anonymous pool has been set up by Miron Cuperman
  (miron@extropia.wimsey.com) for experiments.  Send email to
  <pool0-request@extropia.wimsey.com>  with one of the following
  commands in the subject line:

    subscribe
    unsubscribe
    help

_____
<5.5> What is `security through obscurity'?

  `Security through obscurity' refers to the attempt to gain
  protection from system weaknesses by hiding sensitive information
  or programs relating to them.  For example, a company may not make
  public information on its software's encryption techniques to evade
  `attacks' based on knowledge of it. Another example would be
  concealing data on the existence of security holes or bugs in
  operating systems.  Or, some reliance may be made on the fact that
  some standard or mechanism with potential problems is serious
  because they are ``not widely known'' or ``not widely used.''
  `Security through obscurity' is regarded as a very feeble 
  technique at best and inappropriate and ineffective at worst (also
  called the ``head-in-the-sand approach''). See the FAQ for
  alt.security.

_____
<5.6> What are `identity daemons'?
  
  RFC-931 describes a protocol standard that allows UNIX programs to
  query a remote user's login name after connection to a local
  communication socket (a connection of this type is established
  during FTP and TELNET sessions, for example).  The standard is not
  widely supported, perhaps 10% of internet sites currently implement
  it but the number is increasing.  The mechanism is detrimental to
  anonymity.  Regular users cannot disable it but system
  adminstrators can circumvent it.  This standard may represent a
  trend toward greater authentication mechanisms.

_____
<5.7> What is the history behind anonymous posting servers?

  Originally anonymous posting services were introduced for
  individual, particularly volatile newsgroups, where anonymity is
  almost the preferred method of communication, such as talk.abortion
  and  alt.sex.bondage.  One of the first was one by Dave Mack
  started in ~1988 for alt.sex.bondage.  Another early one was
  wizvax.methuen.ma.us run by Stephanie Gilgut (Gilgut Enterprises)
  but was disbanded due to  lack of funds.  The system provided
  anonymous return addresses. n7kbt.rain.com (John Opalko) took up
  the functions of this server, including  reinstating the anonymous
  alias file.  The group ``alt.personals has been chewing through
  servers like there's no tomorrow.''
  
  Spurred by the disappearance of `wizvax' and interested in
  researching the idea, Karl Kleinpaste
  <Karl_Kleinpaste@godiva.nectar.cs.cmu.edu> developed his own system
  from scratch in six hours. By this time the idea of extending the
  server to new, more `mainstream'  groups was starting to emerge,
  and he explored the possibility partly at the specific request  by
  multiple users for anonymity in other groups. ``The intended
  advantage of my system was specifically to allow multiple group
  support, with a single anon identifier across all.  This was
  arguably the single biggest deficiency of previous anon systems.'' 
  K. Kleinpaste posted a message on rec.nude asking users whether an
  anonymous service would be welcome there, and judged a consensus
  against it. 

  K. Kleinpaste introduced what he calls a ``fire extinguisher'' to
  `squelch' or `plonk' abusive users in response to complaints, and
  used this in three cases. Nevertheless, after a few months of
  intense traffic he was eventually  overwhelmed by the abuses of his
  server. ``Even as restricted as it was, my system was subjected to
  abuses to the point where it was ordered dismantled by the
  facilities staff here. Such abuses started right after it was
  created.''

  In ~Nov 1992, Johan Helsingius (julf@penet.FI) set up the most
  controversial anonymous site to date.  anon.penet.fi is based on
  scripts written by K. Kleinpaste and supports anonymized mail,
  posting, and return addresses.  His policy of allowing anonymous
  posting to every Usenet newsgroup has been met with strong and
  serious ideological opposition (e.g. by news adminstrators in
  news.admin.policy). Because of the relative newness and recent
  emergence of the medium, abuses by anonymous posters currently
  seem to have higher visibility than ``routine'' abuses.

  For example, in a recent highly controversial and publicized case, 
  an anonymous user posted a supposed transcript of desperate crew
  dialogue during the Challenger shuttle disaster via anon.penet.fi
  to sci.astro.  Despite that the transcript had been posted in the
  same place up to a year earlier (then non-anonymously) and actually
  originated not with the poster but a New York news tabloid,
  subsequent responses consisted largely of vociferous outrage at the
  poster's use of anonymity. The original poster, using the same
  anonymous handle, later conceded that the story ``seemed likely to
  have been fabricated,'' suggesting the plausible possibility that
  the original intent was not to provoke outrage but gauge reactions
  on the authenticity of the story (albeit crudely), free of personal
  risk from perceived association with the item.  The ensuing
  commotion generated queries for the original article by
  late-entering readers. The anonymous user later posted deliberately
  offensive comments at his detractors.

  Despite voluminous complaints, and even the vocal opposition of K.
  Kleinpaste and eminent news operators, J. Helsingius has avoided
  use of the ``fire extingisher'' and the ``group bouncer''
  mechanisms that limit the scope of the service. The anon.penet.fi
  site has registered over 10,000 users in its initial three months
  of operation.

  A very sophisticated anonymous posting system was recently set up
  (Dec. 1992) by D. Clunie <dclunie@pax.tpa.com.au> that used
  cryptography in both directions (to/from) the server for the
  highest degree of confidentiality seen so far.  However, it was
  running on a public access account, and he had to shut it down
  after only several weeks, upon receiving requests and conditions
  apparently ultimately originating from NSF representatives.  D.
  Clunie has released the software to the public domain.

  See also the appendix on ``views on anonymous posting.''
  
  (Thanks to Carl Kleinpaste
  <Karl_Kleinpaste@godiva.nectar.cs.cmu.edu>, David Clunie
  <dclunie@pax.tpa.com.au> and Johan Helsingius <julf@penet.fi> for
  contributions here.)

_____
<5.8> What new standards are needed to guard electronic privacy?


  Remailing/Posting
  -----------------
  
  - Stable, secure, protected, officially sanctioned and permitted,
    publicly and privately operated anonymous servers and hubs.
  - Official standards for encryption and anonymity in mail and USENET
    postings.
  - Truly anonymous protocols with source and destination information
    obscured or absent and hidden routing mechanisms (chaining,
    encrypted addresses, etc.)
  - Standards for anonymous email addressing, embedding files, and
    remailer site chaining.
  
  General
  -------
  
  - Recognition of anonymity, cryptography, and related privacy
    shields as legitimate, useful, desirable, and crucial by the
    general public and their governments.
  - Widespread use and implementation of these technologies 
    by systems designers into
    hardware, software, and standards, implemented `securely,'
    `seamlessly,' and `transparently'.
  - General shift of use, dependence, and reliance to means other than
    wiretapping and electronic surveillance by law enforcement
    agencies.
  - Publicity, retraction, and dissolution of laws and government
    agencies opposed to privacy, replaced by structures dedicated to
    strengthening and protecting it.


ISSUES
======

_____
<6.1> What is the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF)?

  From ftp.eff.org:/pub/EFF/mission_statement:

  > A new world is arising in the vast web of digital, electronic
  > media which connect us.  Computer-based communication media like
  > electronic mail and computer conferencing are becoming the basis
  > of new forms of community.  These communities without a single,
  > fixed geographical location comprise the first settlements on an
  > electronic frontier.
  > 
  > While well-established legal principles and cultural norms give
  > structure and coherence to uses of conventional media like
  > newspapers, books, and telephones, the new digital media do not
  > so easily fit into existing frameworks.  Conflicts come about as
  > the law struggles to define its application in a context where
  > fundamental notions of speech, property, and place take
  > profoundly new forms. People sense both the promise and the
  > threat inherent in new computer and communications technologies,
  > even as they struggle to master or simply cope with them in the
  > workplace and the home.
  > 
  > The Electronic Frontier Foundation has been established to help
  > civilize the electronic frontier; to make it truly useful and
  > beneficial not just to a technical elite, but to everyone; and to
  > do this in a way which is in keeping with our society's highest
  > traditions of the free and open flow of information and
  > communication.
  
  EFF was started by the multimillionaire Mitchell Kapor, founder of
  Lotus software, and John Barlow, lyricist for the Grateful Dead
  rock band.  A highly publicized endeavor of the organization
  involved the legal defense of  Steve Jackson Games after an FBI
  raid and an accompanying civil suit  (see section on ``Steve
  Jackson Games'').  The foundation publishes EFF News (EFFector
  Online) electronically, send requests to effnews-request@eff.org.
  
  In a letter to Mitchell Kapor from the Chairman of the Subcommittee
  with primary jurisdiction over telecommunications policy dated
  November 5, 1991,  Representative  Edward J. Markey complemented
  Mitchell Kapor on his ``insights on the development of a national
  public information infrastructure'' which ``were appreciated greatly
  by myself and the Members of the Subcommittee'' (complete text in 
  ftp.eff.com:/pub/pub-infra/1991-12):

  > ...we need to pursue policies that encourage the Bell companies to
  > work with other sectors of the communications industry to create
  > a consumer-oriented, public information network. Please let me or
  > my staff know what policies you and others in the computer
  > industry believe would best serve the public interest in creating
  > a reasonably priced, widely available network in which
  > competition is open and innovation rewarded.  I also want to
  > learn what lessons from the computer industry over the past ten
  > to fifteen years should apply to the current debate on
  > structuring the information and communications networks of the
  > future....I ask your help in gaining input from the computer
  > industry so that the Subcommittee can shape policies that will
  > bring this spirit of innovation and entrepreneurship to the
  > information services industry.  

  ftp.eff.org
  ===========
  
  /pub/eff/about-eff
  ---
    A file of basic information about EFF including goals, mission,
    achievements, and current projects. Contains a membership form.

  /pub/eff/mission-statement
  ---
    EFF mission statement.

  /pub/eff/historical/founding-announcement
  ---
    EFF founding press release.

  /pub/eff/historical/eff-history
  ---
    John Perry Barlow's ``Not Terribly Brief History of the EFF'' (July
    10, 1990).  How EFF was conceived and founded, major legal cases,
    and the organizational directions.

  /pub/eff/historical/legal-case-summary
  ---
    EFF legal case summary.


_____
<6.2> What is `operation Sundevil' and the Steve Jackson Game case?

  In the early 1990's a fear spread among U.S. law enforcement agencies
  on the illicit activities of `hackers' and `phreakers' involved in
  such activities as credit card fraud and long-distance call thievery.
  
  (see ftp.eff.org:/pub/SJG/General_Information/EFFector1.04):

  > `Operation Sundevil,' the Phoenix-inspired crackdown of May
  > 8,1990, concentrated on telephone code-fraud and credit-card
  > abuse, and followed this seizure plan with some success. 
  > [Bulletin Board Systems] went down all over America, terrifying
  > the underground and swiftly depriving them of at least some of
  > their criminal instruments.  It also saddled analysts with some
  > 24,000 floppy disks, and confronted harried Justice Department
  > prosecutors with the daunting challenge of a gigantic nationwide
  > hacker show-trial involving highly technical issues in dozens of
  > jurisdictions.

  These `show-trials' have never materialized.  The movement reached
  a crescendo in Texas with the highly publicized case of illegal
  search and seizure involving the Steve Jackson Games company of
  Austin Texas on March 1, 1990.  From the column GURPS' LABOUR LOST
  by Bruce Sterling <bruces@well.sf.ca.us> in Fantasy and Science
  Fiction Magazine:

  > In an early morning raid with an unlawful and unconstitutional
  > warrant, agents of the Secret Service conducted a search of the
  > SJG office.  When they left they took a manuscript being prepared
  > for publication, private electronic mail, and several computers,
  > including the hardware and software of the SJG Computer Bulletin
  > Board System.  Yet Jackson and his business were not only
  > innocent of any crime, but never suspects in the first place. 
  > The raid had been staged on the unfounded suspicion that
  > somewhere in Jackson's office there `might be' a document
  > compromising the security of the 911 telephone system.

  FBI agents involved in the seizure were named in a civil suit filed
  on behalf of Steve Jackson Games by The Electronic Frontier
  Foundation.  See information on EFF below.
  
  ftp.eff.org
  ===========
  
  /pub/cud/papers/sundevil
  ---
    A collection of information on Operation SunDevil by the Epic
    nonprofit publishing project. Everything you wanted to know but
    could never find.

  /pub/cud/papers/sj-resp
  ---
    Steve Jackson's response to the charges against him.

_____
<6.3> What is Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN)?

  ISDN is a high-speed data communications standard that utilizes
  existing copper telephone lines, and is a possible inexpensive and
  intermediate alternative to laying fiber optic cable for phone
  networks.  The speeds involved may be sufficient for audio and
  video transmission applications.  G. V. der Leun in the file
  ftp.eff.org: /pub/pub-infra/1991-11:

  > Telecommunications in the United States is at a crossroads.  With
  > the Regional Bell Operating Companies now free to provide
  > content, the shape of the information networking is about to be
  > irrevocably altered.  But will that network be the open,
  > accessible, affordable network that the American public needs? 
  > You can help decide this question.
  > 
  > The Electronic Frontier Foundation recently presented a plan to
  > Congress calling for the immediate deployment of a national
  > network based on existing ISDN technology, accessible to anyone
  > with a telephone connection, and priced like local voice service.
  >  We believe deployment of such a platform will spur the
  > development of innovative new information services, and maximize
  > freedom, competitiveness, and civil liberties throughout the
  > nation.
  > 
  > The EFF is testifying before Congress and the FCC; making
  > presentations to public utility commisions from Massachusetts to
  > California; and meeting with representatives from telephone
  > companies, publishers, consumer advocates, and other stakeholders
  > in the telecommunications policy debate.
  > 
  > The EFF believes that participants on the Internet, as pioneers on
  > the electronic frontier, need to have their voices heard at this
  > critical moment.

  To automatically receive a description of the platform and details,
  send mail to archive-server@eff.org, with the following line:

    send documents open-platform-overview

  or send mail to eff@eff.org.  See also the Introduction to the EFF
  Open Platform Proposal in ftp.eff.org:/pub/pub-infra/1991-02.

  
  References
  ==========

  ``Digital Data On Demand.'' MacWorld, 2/82 (page 224).
  ---
    56Kbps vs. ISDN services and products. See comments by J. Powers
    in ftp.eff.org:pub/pub-infra/1992-02.

  ``Telephone Service That Rings of the Future.'' By Joshua Quittner. 
  Newsday, Tue, Jan 7 1992.
  ---
    Implications of ISDN for the masses, written in popular science
    style.   John Perry Barlow (cofounder EFF). Regional telephone
    companies (Ohio Bell).  ISDN as ``Technological Rorschach Test.''
     Anecdotes about McDonald's,  Barbara Bush teleconferencing. See
    complete text in ftp.eff.org:/pub/pub-infra/1992-01.
    
  ftp.eff.org:/pub/pub-infra/
  ---
    Files 1991-11 through 1992-05 containing email from the EFF public
    infrastructure group organized by month.  Opinions and facts on
    the pros and cons of ISDN, Integrated Services Digital Network. 
    Uses of ISDN (phone video, audio, etc.)  Japanese model.
    Alternatives to ISDN (HDSL, ADSL, fiber optics). Technical 
    specifications of ISDN, implementation details, cost issues,
    political obstacles, (RBOC, Regional Bell Operating Companies or
    `Baby Bells', e.g. NET, New England Telephone).  Influencing
    development of future networks (e.g. ISDN and NREN, National
    Research and Education  Network), encouraging competition (cable
    TV systems). Press releases and news articles.  Letter from Rep.
    E. J. Markey to M. Kapor.

_____
<6.4> What is the National Research and Education Network (NREN)?

  The Nation Research and Education Network was introduced in
  legislation cosponsored by Sen. A. Gore to promote high-speed data
  network infrastructure augmenting the internet with up to 50 times
  faster transmission rates.  The bill passed the House on November
  20, 1991, the Senate on November 22, 1991, and was signed by the
  President on December 9, 1991.

  ftp.eff.org
  ===========
  
  /pub/EFF/legislation/nren-bill-text
  ---
    The complete text of the House-Senate compromise version of S.
    272, the High-Performance Computing Act.

  /pub/internet-info/gore.bill
  ---
    102nd congress 1st Session. Text of high performance computing
    bill cosponsored by Sen. A. Gore.


  /pub/EFF/legislation/gore-infrastructure-bill
  ---
    The text of S.2937, the Information Infrastructure and Technology
    Act of 1992 introduced by Senator Gore to expand Federal efforts
    to develop technologies for applications of high-performance
    computing and high-speed networking, and to provide for a
    coordinated Federal program to accelerate development and
    deployment of an advanced information infrastructure.

  U.S. SAID TO PLAY FAVORITES IN PROMOTING NATIONWIDE COMPUTER NETWORK
  By John Markoff, N.Y. Times (~18 Dec 91).
  ---
    President Bush's legislation for natiowide computer data
    `superhighway.'  IBM-MCI venture as monopoly destructive to fair
    competition and  innovation?  National Science Foundation NSFnet.
    complete text in  /pub/pub-infra/1991-12.

  Commentary
  ==========

  /pub/academic/statements/nren.privacy.cpsr
  ---
    ``Proposed Privacy Guidelines for the NREN'' -- Statement of Marc
    Rotenberg, Washington Director Computer Professionals for Social
    Responsibility (CPSR).

  /pub/internet-info/cisler.nren
  ---
    The National Research and Education Network: Two meetings Steve
    Cisler, Senior Scientist Apple Computer Library December 17, 1990
    Summary of meetings exploring educational issues of NREN by
    diverse members of academia and industry.

  /pub/internet-info/privatized.nren
  ---
    Feb. 14 1991 essay by M. Kapor advocating advantages of a private
    National Public  Network, and specific recommendations for open
    NREN policies encouraging  competition.


  /pub/eff/papers/netproposition
  ---
    An FYI about the proposed NREN setup.

_____
<6.5> What is the FBI's proposed Digital Telephony Act?

  ``Providers of electronic communication services and private branch
  exchange operators shall provide within the United States
  capability and capacity for the government to intercept wire and
  electronic communications when authorized by law...''
  
  ftp.eff.org
  ===========
  
  /pub/eff/legislation/fbi-wiretap-bill
  /pub/EFF/legislation/new-fbi-wiretap-bill
  ---
    A bill to ensure the continuing access of law enforcement to the
    content of wire and electronic communications when authorized by
    law and for other purposes. Version 2 of the bill after FBI
    changes in response to public response.

  /pub/cud/law/hr3515
  ---
    House of Rep bill 3515, Telecommunications Law.

  Commentary
  ==========
  
  /pub/eff/papers/eff-fbi-analysis
  ---
    The EFF-sponsored analysis of the FBI's Digital Telephony proposal.

  /pub/eff/papers/ecpa.layman
  ---
    The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986: A Layman's View.

  /pub/eff/papers/nightline-wire
  ---
    Transcript of ABC's Nightline of May 22, 1992, on the FBI,
    Privacy, and Proposed Wire-Tapping Legislation. Featured are Marc
    Rotenberg of the CPSR and William Sessions, Director of the FBI.

  /pub/eff/papers/edwards_letter
  ---
    A letter from the Director of the Secret Service to US Rep. Don
    Edwards, D-California, in response to questions raised by
    Edwards' Subcommittee. This copy came from Computer Professionals
    for Social Responsibility in Washington, D.C.

  /pub/eff/papers/fbi.systems
  ---
    A description of how information is stored on the FBI's computer
    systems.


_____
<6.6> What other U.S. legislation is related to privacy?

  ftp.eff.org
  ===========
  
  /pub/cud/law/<state>  
  ---
    State computer crime laws:
                                  AL, AK, AZ, CA, CO, CT, DE, FL, GA,
                                  HI, IA, ID, IL, IN, MD, MN, NC, NJ,
                                  NM, NY, OR, TX, VT, VA, WA, WI, WV.

  /pub/cud/law/<country>
  ---
    Current computer crime laws for: The United States (federal
    code), Canada, Ghana, and Great Britain.

  /pub/cud/law/bill.s.618
  ---
    Senate bill 618, addressing registration of encryption keys with
    the government.

  /pub/cud/law/improve
  ---
    Improvement of Information Access bill.

  /pub/cud/law/monitoring
  ---
    Senate bill 516; concerning abuses of electronic monitoring in the
    workplace.

  /pub/cud/law/us.e-privacy
  ---
    Title 18, relating to computer crime & email privacy.

  /pub/academic/law/privacy.electronic.bill
  ---
    The text of Simon's electronic privacy bill, S. 516. ``To prevent
    potential abuses of electronic monitoring in the workplace.''

_____
<6.7> What are references on rights in cyberspace?

  ftp.eff.org
  ===========

  /pub/cud/papers/const.in.cyberspace
  ---
    Laurence Tribe's keynote address at the first Conference on
    Computers, Freedom, & Privacy. `The Constitution in Cyberspace'

  /pub/cud/papers/denning
  ---
    Paper presented to 13th Nat'l Comp Security Conf ``Concerning
    Hackers Who Break into Computer Systems'' by Dorothy E Denning.

  /pub/cud/papers/privacy
  ---
    ``Computer Privacy vs First and Fourth Amendment Rights'' by
    Michael S. Borella

  /pub/cud/papers/rights-of-expr
  ---
    Rights of Expression in Cyberspace by R. E. Baird

  /pub/academic/eff.rights
  ---
    Bill of Rights' meaning in the Electronic Frontier.

_____
<6.8> What is the Computers and Academic Freedom (CAF) archive?

  The CAF Archive is an electronic library of information about
  computers and academic freedom. run by the Computers and Academic
  Freedom group on the Electronic Frontier Foundation FTP site.
  
  > If you have gopher, the archive is browsable with the command:
  >   gopher -p academic gopher.eff.org
  > 
  > It is available via anonymous ftp to ftp.eff.org (192.88.144.4) in
  > directory `pub/academic'. It is also available via email. For
  > information on email access send email to archive-server@eff.org.
  > In the body of your note include the lines `help' and `index'.
  > 
  > For more information, to make contributions, or to report typos
  > contact J.S. Greenfield (greeny@eff.org).

  ftp.eff.org
  ===========
  
  /pub/academic/statements/caf-statement
  ---
    Codifies the application of academic freedom to academic
    computers, reflecting seven months of on-line discussion about
    computers and academic freedom.  Covers free expression, due
    process, privacy, and user participation.

  /pub/academic/books
  ---
    Directory of book references related to Computers and Academic
    Freedom or mentioned in the CAF discussion. The file books/README
    is a bibliography.

  /pub/academic/faq/archive
  ---
    List of files available on the Computers and Academic Freedom
    archive.

  /pub/academic/news
  ---
    Directory of all issues of the Computers and Academic Freedom
    News. A full list of abstracts is available in file `abstracts'.
    The special best-of-the-month issues are named with their month,
    for example, `June'.

_____
<6.9> What is the background behind the Internet?
 
  The article ``Internet'' in Fantasy and Science Fiction by Bruce
  Sterling <bruces@well.sf.ca.us> contains general and nontechnical
  introductory notes on origins of the Internet, including the role
  of the RAND corporation, the goal of network resilience in face of
  nuclear attack, MIT, UCLA, ARPANET, TCP/IP, NSF, NREN, etc.:

  > ARPANET itself formally expired in 1989, a happy victim of its 
  > own overwhelming success.  Its users scarcely noticed, for
  > ARPANET's  functions not only continued but steadily improved. 
  > The use of  TCP/IP standards for computer networking is now
  > global.  In 1971, a  mere twenty-one years ago, there were only
  > four nodes in the  ARPANET  network.  Today there are tens of
  > thousands of  nodes in  the Internet,  scattered over forty-two
  > countries, with more coming  on-line every day.   Three million,
  > possibly four million people use  this gigantic
  > mother-of-all-computer-networks.   
  > 
  > The Internet is especially popular among scientists, and is 
  > probably the most important scientific instrument of the late 
  > twentieth century.   The  powerful, sophisticated access that it 
  > provides to specialized data and personal communication  has sped
  > up the pace of scientific research enormously.  
  > 
  > The Internet's pace of growth in the early 1990s is  spectacular, 
  > almost ferocious.  It is spreading faster than cellular phones,
  > faster  than fax machines.  Last year the Internet was growing at
  > a rate of  twenty percent a *month.*  The number of `host'
  > machines with direct  connection to TCP/IP has been doubling
  > every year since  1988.   The Internet is moving out of  its
  > original base in military and  research institutions,  into
  > elementary and high schools, as well as into  public libraries
  > and the commercial sector.

  References
  ==========

  Bowers, K., T. LaQuey, J. Reynolds, K. Roubicek, M. Stahl, and A.
  Yuan, ``Where to Start - A Bibliography of General Internetworking
  Information'' (RFC-1175), CNRI, U Texas, ISI, BBN, SRI, Mitre,
  August 1990.

  The Whole Internet Catalog & User's Guide by Ed Krol.  (1992)
  O'Reilly  and Associates, Inc.
  ---
    A clear, non-jargonized introduction to the  intimidating business
    of network literacy written in humorous style.

  Krol, E., ``The Hitchhikers Guide to the Internet'' (RFC-1118),
  University of Illinois Urbana, September 1989.

  ``The User's Directory to Computer Networks'', by Tracy LaQuey.

  The Matrix: Computer Networks and Conferencing Systems Worldwide. 
  by John Quarterman.  Digital Press: Bedford, MA. (1990)  
  ---
    Massive and highly technical compendium detailing the
    mind-boggling scope and  complexity of global internetworks.

  ``!%@:: A Directory of Electronic Mail Addressing and Networks'' by
  Donnalyn Frey and Rick Adams.
      
  The Internet Companion, by Tracy LaQuey with Jeanne C. Ryer (1992)  
  Addison Wesley. 
  ---
    ``Evangelical'' etiquette guide to the Internet featuring 
    anecdotal tales of life-changing Internet experiences.  Foreword
    by  Senator Al Gore.

  Zen and the Art of the Internet: A Beginner's Guide by Brendan P. 
  Kehoe (1992)  Prentice Hall. 
  ---
    Brief but useful Internet guide with  plenty of good advice on
    useful databases.


  See also ftp.eff.com:/pub/internet-info/.  (Thanks to Bruce Sterling
  <bruces@well.sf.ca.us> for contributions here.)


  General
  =======

  Cunningham, Scott and Alan L. Porter. ``Communication Networks: A
  dozen  ways they'll change our lives.'' The Futurist 26, 1
  (January-February,  1992): 19-22.

  Brian Kahin, ed., BUILDING INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE (New York: 
  McGraw-Hill, 1992) ISBN# 0-390-03083-X
  ---
    Essays on information infrastructure.  Policy and design issues,
    research and NREN, future visions, information markets.  See
    table  of contents in ftp.eff.org:/pub/pub-infra/1992-03.

  Shapard, Jeffrey. ``Observations on Cross-Cultural Electronic 
  Networking.'' Whole Earth Review (Winter) 1990: 32-35.

  Varley, Pamela. ``Electronic Democracy.'' Technology Review 
  (November/December, 1991): 43-51.

______
<6.10> How Internet `anarchy' like the English language?

  According to Bruce Sterling <bruces@well.sf.ca.us>:

  > The Internet's `anarchy' may seem strange or even unnatural,  but
  > it makes a certain deep and basic sense.  It's rather like the 
  > `anarchy' of the English language.  Nobody rents English, and
  > nobody  owns English.    As an English-speaking person, it's up
  > to you to learn  how to speak English properly  and make whatever
  > use you please  of it (though the government provides certain
  > subsidies to help you  learn to read and write a bit).  
  > Otherwise, everybody just sort of  pitches in, and somehow the
  > thing evolves on its own, and somehow  turns out workable.  And
  > interesting.   Fascinating, even.   Though a lot  of people earn
  > their living from using and exploiting  and teaching  English,
  > `English' as an institution is public property, a public good.  
  > Much the same goes for the Internet.   Would English  be improved
  > if  the `The English Language, Inc.'  had a board of directors
  > and a chief  executive officer, or a President and a Congress?  
  > There'd probably be  a lot fewer new words in English, and a lot
  > fewer new ideas.  



FOOTNOTES
=========

_____
<7.1> Most Wanted list

  Hopefully you have benefitted from this creation, compilation, and
  condensation of information from various sources regarding privacy,
  identity, and anonymity on the internet.  The author is committed
  to keeping this up-to-date and strengthening it, but this can only
  be effective with your feedback.  In particular, the following
  items are sought:
  
  - Short summaries of RFC documents and other references listed.
  - More data on the specific uses and penetration of RFC-931.
  - Internet traffic statistics.  How much is email?  How much
    USENET?  What are the costs involved?
  - Famous or obscure examples of compromised privacy
    on the internet.
  - FTP site for the code to turn the .plan file into a named
    pipe for sensing/reacting to remote `fingers'.
  - Knowledge on the `promiscuous' mode of receipt or transmission 
    on network  cards.
  - Details on the infamous experiment where a scientist resubmitted 
    previously accepted papers to a prominent journal with new and
    unknown authors that were subsequently rejected.
  - X Windows FAQhood in news.answers.
  - Commerical use of this document is negotiable and is a way for
    the author to recoup from a significant time investment.

  Email feedback to ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu.  Please note
  where you saw this (which newsgroup, etc.).

_____
<7.2> Change history

  2/14/93 v2.0 (current)

    Major revisions.  New section for X Windows.  Some email privacy
    items reorganized to network security section.  New sections for
    email liability issues, anonymity history and responsibilities. 
    Split into three files.  Many new sources added, particularly
    from EFF and CAF in new `issues' part. `commentary' from 
    news.admin.policy.  21 day automated posting starts.

  2/3/93 v1.0

    More newsgroups & FAQs added.  More `Most Wanted'.  Posted to
    news.answers.  Future monthly posting to sci.crypt, alt.privacy.

  2/1/93 v0.3
  
    Formatted to 72 columns for quoting etc. `miscellaneous,'
    `resources' sections added with cypherpunk servers and use
    warnings.  More UNIX examples (`ls' and `chmod').  Posted to
    alt.privacy, comp.society.privacy.
  
  1/29/93 v0.2
    
    `Identity' and `Privacy' sections added.  `Anonymity' expanded.
    Remailer addresses removed due to lack of information and
    instability.  Posted to sci.crypt.
  
  1/25/93 v0.1
  
    Originally posted to the cypherpunks mailing list on 1/25/93 as a
    call to organize a list of anonymous servers.
  
  email ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu for earlier versions.


* * *

SEE ALSO
========

Part 1 (previous file)
------
<1.1> What is `identity' on the internet?
<1.2> Why is identity (un)important on the internet?
<1.3> How does my email address (not) identify me and my background?
<1.4> How can I find out more about somebody from their email address?
<1.5> Why is identification (un)stable on the internet? 
<1.6> What is the future of identification on the internet?

<2.1> What is `privacy' on the internet?
<2.2> Why is privacy (un)important on the internet?
<2.3> How (in)secure are internet networks?
<2.4> How (in)secure is my account?
<2.5> How (in)secure is X Windows?
<2.6> How (in)secure is my email?
<2.7> How am I (not) liable for my email and postings?
<2.8> How do I provide more/less information to others on my identity?
<2.9> Who is my sysadmin?  What does s/he know about me?
<2.10> Why is privacy (un)stable on the internet?
<2.11> What is the future of privacy on the internet?

<3.1> What is `anonymity' on the internet?
<3.2> Why is `anonymity' (un)important on the internet?
<3.3> How can anonymity be protected on the internet?
<3.4> How do I send anonymous mail?
<3.5> How do I post anonymously?
<3.6> How do I `kill' anonymous postings?
<3.7> What are the responsibilities associated with anonymity?
<3.8> Why is anonymity (un)stable on the internet?
<3.9> What is the future of anonymity on the internet?

Part 3 (next file)
------
<8.1> What is the value of anonymity?
<8.2> Should anonymous posting to all groups be allowed?
<8.3> What should system operators do with anonymous postings?

* * *

This is Part 2 of the Privacy & Anonymity FAQ, obtained via anonymous
  FTP to pit-manager@mit.edu:/pub/usenet/news.answers/net-privacy/ or 
  newsgroups news.answers, sci.answers, alt.answers every 21 days.
Written by L. Detweiler <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>.
All rights reserved.
Path: senator-bedfellow.mit.edu!senator-bedfellow.mit.edu!usenet
From: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu (L. Detweiler)
Newsgroups: sci.crypt,alt.privacy,alt.answers,sci.answers,news.answers
Subject: Privacy & Anonymity on the Internet FAQ
Followup-To: poster
Date: 16 Feb 1993 06:03:46 GMT
Organization: TMP Enterprises
Lines: 433
Approved: news-answers-request@MIT.Edu
Expires: 23 Mar 1993 06:02:09 GMT
Message-ID: <net-privacy/part3_729842529@athena.mit.edu>
References: <net-privacy/part1_729842529@athena.mit.edu>
Reply-To: ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu
NNTP-Posting-Host: pit-manager.mit.edu
Summary: Comments excerpted from a ~Nov. 1993 dialog on 
 news.admin.policy regarding anonymity on USENET.
X-Last-Updated: 1993/02/16
Xref: senator-bedfellow.mit.edu sci.crypt:13749 alt.privacy:5905 alt.answers:30 sci.answers:35 news.answers:6019

Archive-name: net-privacy/part3
Last-modified: 1993/2/15
Version: 2.0

COMMENTARY on ANONYMITY on the INTERNET
=======================================

Compiled by L. Detweiler <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>.

<8.1> What is the value of anonymity?
<8.2> Should anonymous posting to all groups be allowed?
<8.3> What should system operators do with anonymous postings?

* * *

COMMENTARY
==========

_____
<8.1> What is the value of anonymity?

  KONDARED@PURCCVM.BITNET:
    
  > I think anonymous posts do help in focusing our attention on the
  > content of one's message. Sure lot of anonymous posts are abusive
  > or frivolous but in most cases these are by users who find the
  > anon facility novel. Once the novelty wears off they are stopping
  > their pranks...

  morgan@engr.uky.edu (Wes Morgan):

  > I don't mind seeing the miscellaneous hatred/prejudice/racism;
  > those things are part of our nature.  However,  the notion of
  > providing anonymity's shield for these ideas repulses me.   If
  > they have such strong feelings, why can't they put their name(s)
  > on  their postings? ... Quite frankly, I loathe communication
  > with people who refuse to use their names.

  dclunie@pax.tpa.com.au (David Clunie)
   
  > Many seem to question the value of anonymity. But who are they to
  > say what risks another individual should take ? There is no
  > question that in this rather conservative society that we live
  > in, holding certain views, making certain statements, adopting a
  > certain lifestyle, are likely to result in public censure,
  > ridicule, loss of status, employment, or even legal action. Given
  > the heterogeneity of the legal jurisdictions from where the many
  > contributors to usenet post, who knows what is legal and what is
  > not ! Some say that anonymous posters are "cowards" and should
  > stand up and be counted. Perhaps that is one point of view but
  > what right do these detractors have to exercise such censorship ?

  From: doug@cc.ysu.edu (Doug Sewell)
  
  > Why is it censorship to not expect someone to speak for
  > themselves, without the cloak of anonymity.  This is at best a
  > lame argument. 
  > 
  > You tell me why what you have to say requires anonymity.  And you
  > tell me why the wishes of a majority of non-anonymous users of a
  > newsgroup should be disregarded when they don't want anonymous
  > posts.
  > 
  > Anonymous users have LESS rights than any others.  They are not
  > legitimate usenet participants. I would not honor RFDs, CFVs,
  > control messages, or votes from one.

  brad@clarinet.com (Brad Templeton):
  
  > I can think of no disadvantage caused by anon posting sites that
  > doesn't already exist, other than the fact that they do make more
  > naive net users who don't know how to post anonymously the old
  > way more prone to do it.

  From: mandel@netcom.com (Tom Mandel)
  
  > I cannot speak for others but I regard anonymous postings in a
  > serious discussion as pretty much worthless. ... views that hide 
  > behind the veil of anon are hardly worth the trouble of reading.
  
  From: 00acearl@leo.bsuvc.bsu.edu
  
  > Instead of making this a "free-er medium" by allowing posters to
  > "protect themselves" with anonymity, simply require that all
  > posters be prepared to discuss their sources of information and
  > take the heat for unsubstantiated dribble.  This seems to be the
  > way things are currently done; 

  xtkmg@trentu.ca (Kate Gregory):
  
  > In misc.kids there are three threads going on started by anonymous
  > posters. One was about changing jobs so as to work less hours,
  > job sharing and so on, from a woman who didn't want anyone at her
  > current place of work to know she was thinking of looking for
  > work elsewhere. The next was from a woman who is thinking of
  > having a baby sometime soon and doesn't want coworkers, friends,
  > family etc etc to know all about it, but who wants advice. The
  > third is about sex after parenthood -- actually this was started
  > by people posting in the usual way but then it was pointed out
  > that the anonymous posting service might let more people
  > participate.
  > 
  > Misc.kids doesn't seem to be suffering any harm from the presence
  > of anonymous posters; in fact it seems to have been helped by it.

  hoey@zogwarg.etl.army.mil (Dan Hoey):
  
  > While there has never been any real security against anonymous or
  > forged postings on Usenet, the process has until now been
  > sufficiently inconvenient, error-prone, and undocumented to limit
  > its use by persons who have not learned the culture of the net.
  >
  > On the other hand, a recent use of the anonymous posting service
  > on sci.math seemed seemed to be a student asking help on a
  > homework problem. It has now been attributed to a teacher,
  > asking for an explanation of a dubious answer in his teaching
  > guide.  He says his news posting is broken, so he is using the
  > anonymous service as a mail-to-news gateway.

  red@redpoll.neoucom.edu (Richard E. Depew):

  > The consensus seems to be that a general anonymous posting service
  > such as that at anon.penet.fi seems sufficiently corrosive of the
  > trust and civility of the net that this particular experiment
  > should be ended.  Perhaps the next time the question comes up we
  > can say: "We tried it - we learned it does more harm than good -
  > and we stopped it." 

  dave@elxr.jpl.nasa.gov (Dave Hayes):

  > What a primal example of human nature. I have three questions for
  > you folks. 
  > 
  > Do people really say different things to each other based upon
  > whether their identity is or isn't known?
  > 
  > Are people really so affected by what other people say that the
  > verbage is labeled "abuse"?
  > 
  > Most importantly, on a forum that prizes itself on the freedom of
  > communication that it enjoys, is there really such a thing as
  > freedom of communication?
  
  Karl_Kleinpaste@cs.cmu.edu (Karl Kleinpaste):

  > Weak reasoning.
  > With freedom comes responsibility.

  dave@elxr.jpl.nasa.gov (Dave Hayes):
  
  > Responsibility isn't real if it is enforced. True responsibilty
  > comes with no coercion. 

_____
<8.2> Should anonymous posting to all groups be allowed?

  morgan@engr.uky.edu (Wes Morgan):
  
  > I will be the first to admit that I hold some controversial
  > opinions; indeed, I'm sure that none of us are completely
  > orthodox in our opinions. However,  I've received *hundreds* of
  > anonymous email messages over the last few years; fewer than 20
  > of them were "reasonable posts made with good motives." It's 
  > getting more and more difficult to remember why we need anonymity
  > at all; the abusers are (once again) lousing things up for those
  > who truly need the service  (or those who would put it to good
  > use).
  > 
  > I'm not suggesting that we should ban anonymous servers; as I've
  > said, there are several situations in which anonymity is a Good
  > Thing (tm). 
  > 
  > However, the notion that anonymity's shield should be
  > automatically extended to every Usenet discussion is ridiculous;
  > it opens the door to further abuse. 

  twpierce@unix.amherst.edu (Tim Pierce):
  
  > Of course, how does one determine whether a "group" requests the
  > service?  A flat majority of posters voting in favor? A positive
  > margin of 100 votes?  Or what?  No one speaks for a newsgroup.
  > 
  > I'm not convinced by the arguments that an anonymous posting
  > service for all newsgroups is inherently a bad idea, simply
  > because it's a diversion from the status quo. Since the status
  > quo previously permitted anonymous posting to *no* newsgroups,
  > any anonymous posting service would reject the status quo.
  
  hartman@ulogic.UUCP (Richard M. Hartman) writes:
  
  > It is facist to suggest that a newsgroup is best able to decide
  > whether it wants to allow anonymous postings instead of having
  > them forced upon them by an service administrator?

  ogil@quads.uchicago.edu (Brian W. Ogilvie):

  > The service provides a mechanism for forwarding mail to the
  > original poster. Since most Usenet readers don't know John Smith
  > from Jane Doe except by their opinions and their address, the
  > effect of having an anonymous posting to which mail replies can
  > be directed is minimal, except for those who personally know the
  > poster--and ... the lack of anonymity could be serious. Any
  > mechanism like this is liable to abuse, but the benefits as well
  > as the costs must be weighed. Limiting the service to alt groups,
  > or specific groups, would not help those who want advice on
  > sensitive issues in more 'professional' newsgroups.

  From: tarl@sw.stratus.com (Tarl Neustaedter)
  
  > An additional point is that some of us find anonimity in technical
  > matters to be profoundly offensive; anonimity in different forums
  > has different meanings. If I get a phone call from someone who
  > won't identify himself, I hang up. If I get U.S. mail with no
  > return address, it goes into the garbage unopened. If someone
  > accosts me in the street while wearing a mask, I back away -
  > carefully, and expecting violence. In a technical discussion,
  > anonimity means that the individual isn't willing to associate
  > himself with the matter being discussed, which discredits his
  > utterances and makes listening to them a waste of time.
  
  jik@mit.edu (J. Kamens):
  
  > It seems obvious to me that the default should be *not* to allow
  > anonymous postings in a newsgroup.  The Usenet has always
  > operated on the principle that the status quo should be kept
  > unless there's a large number of people who want to change it.
  > 
  > If someone REALLY needs to post a message anonymous in a newsgroup
  > in which this usually isn't done, they can usually find someone
  > on the net to do this for them. They don't need an automated
  > service to do it, and the automated service is by its nature
  > incapable of making the judgment call necessary to decide whether
  > a particular posting really needs to be anonymous.

  From: twpierce@unix.amherst.edu (Tim Pierce)
  
  > For any newsgroup you name, I bet I can envision a scenario
  > involving a need for secrecy. If an accurate content-based
  > filter of each anonymous posting could be devised to screen out
  > those that don't require secrecy, wonderful.  But it can't be
  > done.

  From: lhp@daimi.aau.dk (Lasse Hiller|e Petersen)
  
  > If a newsgroup wants to be noise- and nuisance-free, then it
  > should call for moderation. This should happen on a per-newsgroup
  > basis, and not as a general USENET ban on anonymous postings. Of
  > course one principle of moderation might be to keep out all
  > anonymous postings, and could be achieved automatically. It would
  > still be _moderation_. Personally I would prefer moderation
  > criteria being based on actual content.

  David A. Clunie (dclunie@pax.tpa.com.au)
  
  > If a "group" doesn't want to receive certain posts it should
  > become moderated - there are clearly defined mechanisms on
  > non-alt groups for this to take place. An automated moderator
  > excluding posts from certain (eg. anonymous) sites or individuals
  > could easily be established. If anyone wants to take such a
  > draconian approach then they are welcome to do so and good luck
  > to them. I doubt if I will be reading their group !

  From: 00acearl@leo.bsuvc.bsu.edu

  > Remember, this is a newsgroup for posters writing about SCIENTIFIC
  > issues.  Anonymous discussion of scientific issues leads to bad
  > science.


_____
<8.3> What should system operators do with anonymous postings?

  From: emcguire@intellection.com (Ed McGuire)
  
  > I would like to know how to junk all articles posted by the
  > anonymous service currently being discussed.  Ideally I would
  > actually tell my feed site not to feed me articles posted by the
  > anonymous service. Assuming the C News Performance Release, what
  > is a simple way to accomplish this? Or where should I look to
  > learn how to do it myself?
  
  From: dclunie@pax.tpa.com.au (David Clunie)
  
  > That's a bit draconian isn't it ? Have your users unanimously
  > decided that they would like you to do this or have you decided
  > for them ?
  
  Carl Kleinpaste (Karl_Kleinpaste@godiva.nectar.cs.cmu.edu):
  
  > ...were I to be in the position of offering such a service again,
  > my promises of protection of anonymity would be limited.  Not on
  > the basis of personal opinion of what gets posted, but on the
  > basis of postings which disrupt the smooth operation of the
  > Usenet. The most obvious and direct recourse would be to `out'
  > the abusive individual. Less drastic possibilities exist -- the
  > software supports a "fire extinguisher" by which individuals can
  > be prevented from posting.

  john@iastate.edu (John Hascall):
  
  > Since when is Usenet a democracy? If someone wants to run an
  > anonymous service, that's their business. If you want to put
  > that host in your killfile, that's your business. If a newsadmin
  > wants to blanket-drop all postings from that site, that's between
  > them and the other people at that site. If everyone ignores a
  > service, the service effectively doesn't exist.

  jbotz@mtholyoke.edu (Jurgen Botz): 
  
  > I think that what ... these points show clearly is that an
  > anonymous posting service has a great deal of responsibility,
  > both towards its clients and towards the Net as a whole.  Such a
  > service should (IMHO) have a set of well-defined rules and a
  > contract that its clients should sign, under the terms of which
  > they are assured anonymity.

  From: an8785@anon.penet.fi
  
  > Is the problem that some are used to "punishing" posters who are
  > upsetting in some vague way by complaining to the (usually
  > acquiescent) sysadmin or organizations that the poster belongs
  > to?  That surely is the most gutless approach to solving
  > problems, but my experience on the net shows that the same users
  > who vilify anonymous postings are the first to write obsessively
  > detailed grievances to the poster's supervisor when his or her
  > tranquility is disturbed by some "intrusive" or subversive post
  > or another.
  > 
  > Anonymous postings prevent just this kind of intimidation.

  From: gandalf@cyberspace.org (Eric Schilling)
  
  > The main point I would like to make here is that while we can go
  > through and revise the news sw to "reject anon posts to technical
  > newsgroups" or some such thing, I think the attempt will prove
  > futile. Each attempt to modify news can result in a changed
  > approach by anon service providers to thwart the change.  I think
  > this would be pointless.

  From: dclunie@pax.tpa.com.au (David Clunie)
  
  > I consider the demise of [my] service to have been rather
  > unfortunate, and I wish the Finnish remailer luck ! It is a pity
  > that there are very few if any similar services provided with in
  > the US. I guess that's the benefit of having a constitution that
  > guarantees one freedom of speech and a legal and political system
  > that conspires to subvert it in the name of the public good.


* * *

SEE ALSO
========

Part 1 (first file)
------

<1.1> What is `identity' on the internet?
<1.2> Why is identity (un)important on the internet?
<1.3> How does my email address (not) identify me and my background?
<1.4> How can I find out more about somebody from their email address?
<1.5> Why is identification (un)stable on the internet? 
<1.6> What is the future of identification on the internet?

<2.1> What is `privacy' on the internet?
<2.2> Why is privacy (un)important on the internet?
<2.3> How (in)secure are internet networks?
<2.4> How (in)secure is my account?
<2.5> How (in)secure is X Windows?
<2.6> How (in)secure is my email?
<2.7> How am I (not) liable for my email and postings?
<2.8> How do I provide more/less information to others on my identity?
<2.9> Who is my sysadmin?  What does s/he know about me?
<2.10> Why is privacy (un)stable on the internet?
<2.11> What is the future of privacy on the internet?

<3.1> What is `anonymity' on the internet?
<3.2> Why is `anonymity' (un)important on the internet?
<3.3> How can anonymity be protected on the internet?
<3.4> How do I send anonymous mail?
<3.5> How do I post anonymously?
<3.6> How do I `kill' anonymous postings?
<3.7> What are the responsibilities associated with anonymity?
<3.8> Why is anonymity (un)stable on the internet?
<3.9> What is the future of anonymity on the internet?

Part 2 (previous file)
------

<4.1> What UNIX programs are related to privacy?
<4.2> What are some anonymous remailing and posting sites?
<4.3> How can I learn about or use cryptography?
<4.4> What is the cypherpunks mailing list?
<4.5> What are some privacy-related newsgroups?  FAQs?
<4.6> What is internet Privacy Enhanced Mail (PEM)?
<4.7> What are other Request For Comments (RFCs) related to privacy?
<4.8> How can I run an anonymous remailer?
<4.9> What are references on privacy in email?
<4.10> What are some email, Usenet, and internet use policies?
<4.11> What is the MIT ``CROSSLINK'' anonymous message TV program?

<5.1> What is ``digital cash''?
<5.2> What is a ``hacker'' or ``cracker''?
<5.3> What is a ``cypherpunk''?
<5.4> What is an anonymous pool?
<5.5> What is `security through obscurity'?
<5.6> What are `identity daemons'?
<5.7> What is the history behind anonymous posting servers?
<5.8> What standards are needed to guard electronic privacy?

<6.1> What is the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF)?
<6.2> What is `operation Sun Devil' and the Steve Jackson Game case?
<6.3> What is Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN)?
<6.4> What is the National Research and Education Network (NREN)?
<6.5> What is the FBI's proposed Digital Telephony Act?
<6.6> What other U.S. legislation is related to privacy on networks?
<6.7> What are references on rights in cyberspace?
<6.8> What is the Computers and Academic Freedom (CAF) archive?
<6.9> What is the background behind the Internet?
<6.10> How is Internet `anarchy' like the English language?

<7.1> Most Wanted list
<7.2> Change history

* * *

This is Part 3 of the Privacy & Anonymity FAQ, obtained via anonymous
  FTP to pit-manager@mit.edu:/pub/usenet/news.answers/net-privacy/ or 
  newsgroups news.answers, sci.answers, alt.answers every 21 days.
Written by L. Detweiler <ld231782@longs.lance.colostate.edu>.
All rights reserved.